RESCUE THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FROM RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATIONS: ALCOHOLISM AS AN ILLUSTRATION
By Judith J. Johnson*
We alcoholics are men and women who have lost the ability to control our drinking. We know that no real
alcoholic ever recovers control. All of us felt at times that we were regaining control, but such intervals-usually brief—were inevitably followed by still less control, which led in time to pitiful and
incomprehensible demoralization. We are convinced to a man that alcoholics of our type are in the grip of
a progressive illness. Over any considerable period we get worse, never better. We are like men who have
1
lost their legs; they will never grow new ones. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS

I. Introduction
The Supreme Court has narrowed the doorway into the protected class for the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 in virtually every employment case.3 Taking
their cue from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have been concerned principally with
who is “disabled” and thus protected by the ADA.4 The answer today is, not many.5 The
courts generally have been so hostile to ADA plaintiffs that it is difficult now to find a
case in which the plaintiff was able to prove that he was disabled.6
Congress contemplated that some impairments would always be disabling.7 The
Supreme Court, however, has so narrowly construed the term “significantly limited in a
major life activity,” which defines the protected class, that many impairments formerly
considered to be inevitably disabling, such as alcoholism, are no longer protected by the
ADA.8 Congress referred to alcoholism many times in the legislative history,9 and
included a specific reference to alcoholism in the statute.10 For this reason, and because
alcoholics tend to be discriminated against because they are not perceived to have a “real
illness,”11 I have chosen alcoholism to illustrate the extreme difficulty of proving a
disability under the current caselaw.
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The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”12 Today that
mandate is not being fulfilled, especially in the employment area.13 The ADA was
modeled on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act).14 Although the ADA
specifically provides that it should not be construed to apply a lesser standard than that
applied under the Rehabilitation Act,15 employees who sought protection under that Act
before the ADA was adopted did not have the problems proving that they were disabled
that employees are having today under the ADA.16 In almost every case involving Title
I, the part of the ADA that applies to employment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
ADA so restrictively that one would have to be so impaired that he would generally be
unable to work at all.17 When the Court has dealt with non-employment cases, it has
been much more generous, however.18
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified person with disabilities.19
To be classified as disabled, a person must 1) have an impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities; or 2) have a record of such an impairment; or 3)
be regarded as having such an impairment.20 Major life activities include such things as
seeing, hearing, and taking care of oneself.21 In addition to proving a disability, under
Title I, the person must be “qualified,” which means that he must be able to perform
essential job duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.22
At first blush, it would seem that the ADA itself set up a “catch-22” for
employees to qualify for the protected class, by requiring that they be substantially
limited in the major life activity, but still able to perform the essential duties of the job.23
However, it is the courts that have recently created the dilemma by requiring an
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employee to be so substantially limited in a major life activity that he will generally be
precluded from being able to perform the job.24 The class of disabled people today is
limited virtually to people who are completely blind, deaf or in a wheelchair because they
are totally limited in a major life activity. Many of them cannot work at all. People with
less obvious impairments, such as alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and mental illness,
who can work, usually are not determined to be sufficiently limited in a major life
activity under the Court’s narrow interpretations. Because Congress spent considerable
time discussing protecting persons with such impairments, it is clear that the ADA was
not intended to be restricted to impairments that are totally limiting.25 Congress was
particularly concerned about “stereotypic assumptions” that created myths and fears
about disabled people.26
Alcoholism is a disability about which stereotypic assumptions are particularly
problematic. Alcoholics especially suffer from the “systematic prejudice, stereotypes,
and neglect” that were the central concerns of the ADA.27 They are more likely to be
discriminated against because they are often not perceived to be suffering from a “real”
illness. Alcoholics have also historically been subjected to ridicule and contempt.
Throughout most of recorded history, excessive use of ALCOHOL was
viewed as a willful act leading to intoxication and other sinful behaviors.
The Bible warns against drunkenness; Islam bans alcohol use entirely.
Since the early nineteenth century, the moral perspective has competed
with a conceptualization of excessive use of alcohol as a disease or
disorder, not necessarily a moral failing.28
Congress obviously assumed that alcoholics would be protected by the ADA
because the Act provides that an alcoholic must be able to comply with all employment
requirements.29 Nevertheless, under current caselaw, it is difficult to imagine how an
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alcoholic could be determined to be disabled and yet still be employable. If an alcoholic
is in recovery, his impairment is not significantly affecting any major life activity, under
the Court’s strict interpretations of those terms.30 Surely, the ADA did not intend that
recovering addicts and alcoholics, as well as other people with impairments who are
striving to overcome their limitations, such as diabetics,31 should not receive the benefit
of reasonable accommodations that would allow them to work.32 With regard to
alcoholism, as with most other impairments today, if the plaintiff is able to prove that he
is disabled, he generally would be so impaired that he would be unable to perform the
essential functions of the job. In other words, he would be too impaired to work.33
A recovering alcoholic or an active alcoholic whose work performance is not
affected could argue that he was “perceived as being disabled” or “has a record of
disability,” as alternative paths to meeting the requirement of having a disability for the
purposes of the ADA.34 Although the courts’ interpretations likewise make these
avenues unlikely,35 if an alcoholic plaintiff were to succeed at this point, under neither
path would he likely be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.36
At the present time, most employers believe that they must accommodate an
alcoholic and give him leave to go to treatment.37 However, as this article illustrates,
courts are not protecting alcoholics under the ADA, which will eventually lead to
employers’ refusing the accommodation that has saved countless people from becoming
totally disabled by this debilitating illness, that is, leave to go to treatment. The threat of
losing one’s job is a powerful incentive to get sober, and this will no longer be
available.38
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Obviously, the ADA is asking the wrong question for alcoholism and other
similar impairments, such as diabetes and high blood pressure that without proper
management are inevitably disabling. With proper treatment and management, under the
courts’ restrictive interpretations, such impairments are not disabling. The question
should be, how do we enable such impaired employees to keep working? Congress
clearly intended in enacting the ADA to enable disabled people to work.39 The courts
have disconnected the ADA from its intent by construing the protected class so narrowly
that people who are managing their illnesses, and who may need the smallest
accommodations to do so, are excluded. Inevitably when it becomes common knowledge
that alcoholics are not protected by the ADA, they will simply be fired when they need to
go treatment.
This result is even more likely because, as one author has pointed out,
discrimination against the disabled is rational, that is, it may in fact cost the employer
more in time, money and trouble to employ the disabled; whereas other types of
discrimination, such as race and sex discrimination, are irrational forms of discrimination
and cost the employer nothing to avoid.40 Another author has opined that critics of the
ADA view it as “in effect work[ing] as a subsidy paid by employers through ‘reasonable
accommodation,’ a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the labor market.”41
This author points out that this view does not take into account that disability
discrimination costs the U.S. billions of dollars and that there are other hidden benefits to
employing the disabled.42
This article will examine the disease of alcoholism generally in Section II; the
ADA generally in Section III; Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA and the lower
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court cases concerning alcoholism and the ADA in Section IV. These sections will show
that judicial interpretations have virtually eliminated alcoholism as a disability, contrary
to obvious Congressional intent. While this phenomenon is not limited to alcoholism, it
is a useful illustration of the damage judicial activism has caused in this area.
Section V. will analyze and propose a solution that can be accomplished without a
change in the legislation. Requiring the plaintiff to prove that he has an impairment that
significantly limits a major life activity has become an obstacle for most plaintiffs, but
there are two alternatives to entry into the protected class of disabled persons, being
regarded as disabled or having a record of a disability. These provisions should be
interpreted more generously to prevent people from being discriminated against because
of perceived disabilities. People who are regarded as disabled or who have a record of a
disability are people who can work, but who are being discriminated against because the
employer thinks they cannot do the job. Congress was very clear that this was the type of
discrimination that was intended to be most protected.43
Section VI. concludes that once employers discover that their employees with
impairments such as alcoholism are no longer protected by the ADA, such employees
may be terminated with impunity. The cost of this eventuality is high in economic, as
well as human, terms.
II. Alcoholism generally
“Alcoholism is a primary chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations. The disease is
progressive and is often fatal. It is characterized by impaired control over drinking,
preoccupation with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences, and
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distortions in thinking, mostly denial. Each of these symptoms may be continuous or
periodic.”44 There is no cure, and the only known treatment includes complete
abstinence.45 Alcoholics remain so, whether drinking or not; thus, alcoholics are in either
active addiction or in recovery for life.46 The rehabilitation process, whether inpatient or
outpatient, requires two to four weeks of intensive treatment, followed by three to six
months of outpatient care.47 In order to prevent relapse after rehabilitation, most
alcoholics, especially those in early recovery, require frequent attendance at meetings of
Alcoholics Anonymous and/or counseling.48 Even then, relapse is not uncommon and
must be considered part of the syndrome.49
The principal societal belief is that alcoholics have caused their own impairment.
While this can be said of many impairments,50 such as diabetes and heart disease, society
particularly frowns on alcoholics.51 Because there is a genetic component to alcoholism
that has yet to be fully understood,52 the idea that alcoholics are responsible for their own
impairment must be questioned. Because alcoholics probably have a predisposition to
the disease, the only way to avoid its manifestation is to never take the first drink.
Because ninety percent of the population of Western countries drink alcohol at some time
in their lives,53 generally beginning in their early to mid-teens, alcohol consumption is
“an almost ubiquitous phenomenon” in Western society.54 Society is blaming the victim
in the case of alcoholics, who are simply conforming to the norm in their original
consumption of alcohol.55 Thus, the stereotypical view of alcoholism as a volitional
condition is most likely false.
The stereotypical alcoholic street person is also a false stereotype.56 Alcoholics
usually have jobs and function moderately well in family settings.57 Because they are
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able to work, recovering alcoholics generally may need three types of accommodations.
The first is a leave of absence to attend residential treatment. The second is some
accommodation that allows the employee to attend AA meetings and/or counseling
sessions.58 I would also venture to suggest a third accommodation, and that is, a second
chance if the alcoholic relapses. Because relapse is part of the syndrome,59 alcoholics
should be given at least one second chance. The line has to be drawn, however, between
second chances and multiple chances, which may enable the alcoholic to continue to
drink.
Congress expressly referred to alcoholism in the ADA.60 The cases under the
Rehabilitation Act recognized alcoholism as a per se disability, and the early ADA cases
followed suit.61 Recent cases have uniformly rejected the contention that alcoholism is
disabling, however, leaving alcoholism unprotected by the ADA. To understand how this
has evolved, I will turn to an explanation of the ADA generally, followed by the pertinent
cases.
III. The ADA
A. Statutory provisions.
The ADA is a comprehensive act to protect people with disabilities from
discrimination in public services, accommodations and telecommunications, as well as
employment.62 Title I applies to employment discrimination.63 The ADA essentially
follows the law developed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1963,64 which applied to
federal contractors, the federal government and federal grantees,65 as well as the law66
developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 The ADA’s substantive
provisions are a combination of those statutory provisions as well.68
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The coverage is the same as Title VII, that is, the ADA applies to employers with
more than fifteen employees.69 The protected class consists of any "qualified individual
with a disability" who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the job.70 Disability means a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities, a record of
impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment.71
Many of the provisions of the ADA were taken from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964;72 however, the discrimination provisions of the ADA are much more
specific. The ADA provides, analogously to Title VII, that the employer may not
discriminate against qualified persons with disabilities on the basis of disability in job
application procedures, hiring, advancement, compensation, training and other terms or
conditions of employment.73 The ADA adds specific provisions that prohibit employers
from asking questions regarding disabilities in pre-employment procedures74 and limit the
employer’s ability to require pre-employment physicals,75 except for drug tests.76
The ADA also includes a provision identical to the provision of Title VII that is
the basis for disparate impact,77 which forbids practices that limit opportunities for the
disabled.78 In addition, the ADA has language that more expressly codifies the disparate
impact theory by forbidding practices that screen out or tend to screen out people with
disabilities and practices that have the effect of discriminating, unless they are shown to
be justified by business necessity.79
Defenses to an ADA claim include allowing the employer to demonstrate that any
selection criterion that screens out “an individual with a disability has been shown to be
job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be
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accomplished by reasonable accommodation.”80 Although the requirement for
reasonable accommodation which does not amount to an undue hardship mirrors the Title
VII requirement for religious accommodation,81 the ADA provides that undue hardship is
not to be defined with reference to Title VII.82 The ADA does not define reasonable
accommodation but rather lists possibilities such as: redesigning facilities to make them
accessible; restructuring the work environment, requirements, assignments, schedules,
and equipment; and providing readers or interpreters.83 While reasonable
accommodation is not specifically defined in the act, the examples given of reasonable
accommodations make it clear that a reasonable accommodation can be fairly
burdensome.84
Undue hardship “means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense” on
the part of the employer, when considered in light of a list of factors, including the nature
and cost of accommodation and the financial resources of the facility.85 The obvious
conclusion is that Congress intended that the burden of proving undue hardship would be
onerous.86
The other defenses to the ADA differ from Title VII. The ADA contains no
defense for bona fide seniority systems87 or for a bona fide occupational qualification.88
Furthermore, unlike Title VII, under the ADA the employer may require “that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety” to other persons in the
workplace.89
Title VII's charge-filing and other enforcement procedures are incorporated into
the ADA for the employment provisions of the ADA.90 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended Title VII and the ADA to provide for compensatory and punitive damages in
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intentional discrimination cases.91 However, the Amendment provides that, if the
employer acts in good faith to provide a reasonable accommodation, the employer has a
defense to the imposition of damages.92
Although the ADA specifically provides that it shall not be interpreted less
generously than its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, 93 the Supreme Court has not
taken this provision very seriously. The Court has substantially narrowed the
interpretation of the term “disability” under the ADA in all but one case, and it is not an
employment case.94

B. Supreme Court Interpretations
1. “[A]n individual with disabilities”
a. Bragdon v. Abbott
The Supreme Court’s first foray into the ADA battle in 1998 appeared to signal
that it would read the Act expansively. The question in Bragdon v. Abbott was whether a
healthcare professional had the right to refuse to treat an HIV positive patient in his
office.95 The Court explained that in order to be protected by the ADA, the plaintiff had
to be “an individual with disabilities,” which is defined as having an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. The Court noted that the definition of disability
was derived from the Rehabilitation Act and further noted that the ADA requires that it
be construed according to the law and regulations developed under the Rehabilitation
Act. Consequently, the Court adopted the definition of impairment developed under
regulations under the Rehabilitation Act, 96 which is a mental or physical condition that
affects one or more body systems. The Court found that HIV was an impairment at every
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stage because of the immediacy with which the virus infects the blood cells and the
severity of the disease.97
Having determined that the plaintiff had an impairment, the Court moved on to
whether the impairment substantially affected a major life activity. The Court cited the
regulations, noting again that the ADA must be construed consistently with the
Rehabilitation Act regulations. The ADA regulations, copied from the Rehabilitation Act
regulations, provide a representative list of major life activities which include "functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working."98 The Court reasoned that reproduction, the
major life activity alleged to be limited in this case, is central to life and should be
considered a major life activity.99 The Court said that the regulations did not help to
determine the meaning of “substantially limited,”100 but concluded that “substantially
limited” does not mean utter inability. The plaintiff was substantially limited because
reproduction was dangerous to public health. The Court also bolstered its conclusion that
asymptomatic AIDS was a handicap or disability by reference to all the courts and
agencies that had so held under the Rehabilitation Act.101 The Court stopped short of
holding that AIDS is a per se disability, nor did it hold that the determination of disability
would require an individualized inquiry, except by saying that in this case, the plaintiff
alleged she was substantially limited in reproduction.102 The implication was that if
reproduction were not at issue, a plaintiff would have to identify another major life
activity in which she was substantially limited. The idea that an individualized inquiry
would be required in every case originated in the dissent.103 The Court made it clear in
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the next case that a strict individualized inquiry is necessary to determine whether the
plaintiff is disabled and that there are no per se or presumptively disabling impairments.

b. Sutton v. United Air Lines and companions
1) Sutton
Sutton v. United Air Lines104 involved two sisters who applied for jobs as
commercial airline pilots. They were told that they did not meet the minimum
requirement for uncorrected eyesight, which was 20/100. The plaintiffs’ eyesight was
significantly worse than that, although it was corrected to 20/20 with corrective lenses.
The first question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs’ visual impairment would
be viewed in its corrected or uncorrected state to determine whether they were disabled
under the ADA.105
The Court started out by saying that the EEOC had issued regulations defining
disability, although no agency had been delegated authority to do so.106 The conflict was
not with regard to the regulations, but with the EEOC guidance interpreting the
regulations. The Court noted that the EEOC defined disability, as did the ADA, as “‘A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such the major life
activities of such individual; B) a record of an impairment; or C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.’”107 The plaintiffs alleged first that they were disabled under
subsection A), the first prong of the disability test because they suffered from an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. The EEOC guidance directed
that disability should be determined in its uncorrected state.108 Because the plaintiffs
were severely myopic, they clearly would be disabled, if the measure were their
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uncorrected state. The Court, however, decided that this guidance conflicted with the
plain language of the ADA, and to evaluate persons “in their hypothetical uncorrected
state. . .is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”109 The Court reasoned that the
statute expressed disability in the present tense, “substantially limits;” and that the
inquiry is individualized, so that the question is whether the individual is currently
disabled. However, the Court was unduly impressed by the fact that Congress had
determined that 43 million people were disabled, and if mitigating measures were not
considered, the figure would be much higher.
Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had an impairment which, in its
corrected state did not substantially limit any major life activity.110 The plaintiffs were,
thus, not disabled under the first prong of the Act.
The plaintiffs argued alternatively under subsection (C) of the disability test that
they were regarded as disabled by the employer. The Court said that there were two
possibilities that could arise under this part of the ADA, either the employee has an
impairment that is not substantially limiting or the employee has no impairment at all. In
either situation, the employer must believe that the impairment is substantially
limiting.111 The plaintiffs alleged that the employer regarded them as disabled in the
major life activity of working.
The Court restricted the category of “working” very narrowly, based on the
EEOC regulations.112 Thus, being substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, the Court said, requires
at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad
class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the EEOC uses a specialized
definition of the term “substantially limits” when referring to the major
life activity of working : “significantly restricted in the ability to perform
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either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”113
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were only precluded from one job, that of
global airline pilot, so they were not regarded as substantially limited in working.114 The
Court expressed reluctance to even regard “working” as a major life activity.
Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities" includes
working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations. We
note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining
"major life activities" to include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to
say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from
working with others] . . . then that exclusion constitutes an impairment,
when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by
reason of handicap."115
The Court then “assumed without deciding” that working is a major life activity116 and
has continued to do so since.117

2) Implications of Sutton
The Court’s refusal to fully accept working as a major life activity is inconsistent
with the Court’s acceptance of the identical language in the HEW regulations construing
the Rehabilitation Act and cited in Bragdon v. Abbott as controlling.118 In addition, there
is no question that working represents an activity of central importance to most people’s
lives. “Working is a major part of being ‘normal’ in our society.”119 Comparing working
to the other life activities that the Court has recognized as “major life activities,” such as
“household chores, bathing and brushing one’s teeth,”120 as well as reproduction,121
working must certainly be included from a rational point of view. Furthermore, the
agency interpretations, which are binding under the ADA, have always included it.122
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The Court did not continue its indulgent interpretation of the ADA begun in Bragdon in
another important aspect.
The Court in Sutton also made it clear that there were no per se disabilities, citing
Bragdon v. Abbott for the proposition.123 In fact Bragdon v. Abbott did not require a
strict individualized inquiry, but rather it relied heavily on authority that considered
asymptomatic HIV a disability in every case.124 The only individualized inquiry was in
which major life activity the plaintiff was restricted. She alleged reproduction, but the
Court indicated that there could be others, such sexual activity.125 The Court was clearly
assuming in the Bragdon case that HIV would be disabling in every case, although it may
affect different major life activities.
Beginning with the Sutton case, however, the Court has charted its own course,
ignoring legislative history, agency regulations, and guidances, as well as caselaw
developed under the Rehabilitation Act. The legislative history is clear that Congress
intended that disability be determined in its uncorrected state, and all the agencies
interpreting the Act had held so.126
The Court took an easy case and made bad law. No one wants the ADA to protect
everyone who has to wear glasses. It obviously trivializes the protected class; however,
the ramifications of Sutton go far beyond the population of people wearing corrective
lenses. The Court has been criticized for placing so much reliance on the number of
disabled people cited by Congress, a figure that was posited to be inclusive, rather than
exclusive, of disability.127 Why did the Supreme Court exalt the figure cited by Congress
of 43 million disabled people over the much more important Congressionally expressed
remedial objectives of the ADA?
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The Sutton dissenters had the better view:
We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include within the
category of persons authorized to bring suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 some whom Congress may not have wanted to
protect (those who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2) will exclude from the
threshold category those whom Congress certainly did want to protect
(those who successfully use corrective devices or medicines, such as
hearing aids or prostheses or medicine for epilepsy). Faced with this
dilemma, the statute's language, structure, basic purposes, and history
require us to choose the former statutory line, as Justice STEVENS
(whose opinion I join) well explains. I would add that, if the more
generous choice of threshold led to too many lawsuits that ultimately
proved without merit or otherwise drew too much time and attention away
from those whom Congress clearly sought to protect, there is a remedy.128
As the dissent explained, the Act was not supposed to weed people out in the first
instance. It would not require that airlines hire people who pose a danger, rather the Act
requires that employers justify their employment requirements.129

3) Companion case
Had the Court used one of the companion cases130 to Sutton, Albertson’s Inc. v.
Kirkingburg,131 to express its unauthorized interpretation of the ADA, it would have been
more obvious that clearly intended beneficiaries of the ADA would lose protection. In
the Kirkingburg case, the plaintiff suffered from amblyobia, which is uncorrectable, so
that he could really only see out of one eye.132 Kirkingburg was erroneously hired
because the employer required that all drivers meet the Department of Transportation
requirements, and he could not.133 He drove for over a year before the mistake was
discovered, and he was fired. Kirkingburg obtained a waiver of the requirement from the
Department of Transportation, but the employer would not accept it and refused to re-hire
him.134 The question before the Court was whether the employer was justified in relying
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on the DOT requirements, which a unanimous Court answered in the affirmative because
the DOT waiver program was experimental and not designed to certify safe drivers.135
The pernicious part of the opinion was the Court’s unscrupulous chastisement of
the lower court for so easily finding that Kirkingburg was disabled in the first place.136
The Court said that the lower court had made three missteps in its finding that
Kirkingburg was disabled.137
First, the Court said that although amblyopia is an impairment and “seeing” is a
major life activity, a person with that impairment is not necessarily substantially limited
in seeing. The lower court had in fact said that “‘the manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees
differs significantly from the manner in which most people see’ because, ‘[t]o put it in its
simplest terms [he] sees using only one eye; most people see using two.’"138 The Court
characterized this determination as the lower court’s appearing to be “willing to settle for
a mere difference.”139 This clearly contradicts the lower court’s holding in this regard
and ups the bar for the finding of “significantly limited” in a major life activity.
Secondly, the Court found fault with the lower court’s view that it was irrelevant
whether the plaintiff had made subconscious compensation for his monocular vision.
The Court reiterated from Sutton that mitigating measures, even if produced by the body
and not by artificial aids, must be taken into account.140
Finally, the Court said that the lower court did not pay sufficient heed to the
requirement of an individualized inquiry. The Court said “[s]ome impairments may
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity . . . , we cannot say that
monocularity does.”141 Again, it should be noted that the lower court clearly said that
Kirkingburg could essentially see out of only one eye. It is incredible that the Supreme
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Court should require more. The Court did ultimately concede that monocular vision
would ordinarily be disabling, but its analysis is nevertheless very troubling.142 The
Court was clearly requiring much more than was generally required under prior law to
show that a person was substantially limited in a major life activity, but the Court was not
finished in this regard, as the next case demonstrates.
c. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams
The Court returned to defining “substantially limited” in a “major life activity” in
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams.143 The plaintiff’s use of pneumatic tools while working
for the defendant caused her to suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis. She
was placed on permanent work restrictions that precluded, among other things, lifting
more than 20 pounds, using vibratory tools, engaging in repetitive flexion of her wrists or
elbows or performing overhead work. She was accommodated in a job that did not
require any of this; however, extra duties were added to the job that she could not
perform, and she was ultimately discharged.144 It seems clear that she was disabled, but
she had a problem identifying the major life activity that would allow her to prove that
she was disabled.
She started out arguing that her impairment substantially limited her in the major
life activities of performing manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with her
children, lifting, and working. She also argued that she had a record of a substantially
limiting impairment and that she was regarded as having such an impairment. The
District Court decided that playing with her children, gardening and doing housework
were not major life activities, and she did not appeal that decision. She did appeal the
decision that she was not substantially limited in lifting, working and performing manual
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tasks.145 The Sixth Circuit reversed the finding that she was not substantially limited in
her ability to perform manual tasks. The court said that she had shown a class of manual
activities that she could not perform at work. The court then cited a range of activities
that she could not perform, not just in her job, but in various related jobs, such as
assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs, manual building trade jobs that require
gripping tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended over the shoulder for
any extended periods.146
The Supreme Court limited its consideration to the manual tasks holding and said
that the lower court had erred in assessing whether she was disabled by looking at what
work she could perform, instead of whether she could take care of her personal hygiene
and carry out personal or household chores. The Court proceeded to define major life
activities as those that are of central importance to daily life. “That these terms need to
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is
confirmed by the first section of the ADA.” The Court again cited for this proposition the
reference to 43 million disabled persons in the preamble to the Act147 that the Court had
cited in Sutton.148 The Court said that to be significantly limited in a major life activity,
an impairment “must prevent or severely restrict the person from performing activities
that are of central importance to most people lives.”149 Occupation-specific tasks are not
necessarily of central importance to most peoples’ lives, while “household chores,
bathing and brushing one’s teeth” are.150 The Court said that the plaintiff had said she
could still perform all these activities, but had difficulty sweeping, had to occasionally
have help in dressing, and could not play with her children or drive for long periods. The
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Court said she was not so “severely” restricted in activities that are of central importance
to most people’s lives to amount to a manual task disability.151
Having again severely restricted plaintiffs in their ability to prove that they were
disabled in employment cases, the Court proceeded to decide several cases that do not
deal with the definition of disability. These cases, however, do illustrate the point that
the Court has been hostile to employees in its interpretation of the ADA.

2. Other cases decided under Title I that expand the employer’s ability to defeat an ADA
claim
In Chevron v. Echazabal, the Supreme Court looked at the meaning of the “direct
threat” defense.152 The act defines discrimination as, among other things, using
“qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability" unless the qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business
necessity.153 The Act further provides that an employer may have a qualification
standard that “an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace."154 The defendant had rejected the plaintiff based on a
liver condition that the defendant’s physicians said would be exacerbated by contact with
toxins in the refinery where the plaintiff worked.
The EEOC regulations “allowed an employer to screen out a potential worker
with a disability not only for risks that he would pose to others in the workplace but for
risks on the job to his own health or safety as well.”155 The Supreme Court determined
that the EEOC’s interpretation of the Act was reasonable. The Court did not find
persuasive the legislative history of the Act that indicated Congress’ concern for
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paternalism in enacting the Act or the plain language of the statute, that the direct threat
defense was limited to a direct threat to others.156 As in Sutton, the Court approved of the
EEOC’s interpretation when it restricted the protected class.157
In another defeat for a plaintiff, in Raytheon v. Hernandez,158 the Supreme Court
applied its interpretation of the defense of “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” to the
ADA to find for the defendant. In the Raytheon case, the plaintiff had been discharged
for violating work rules by testing positive for drugs. Two years later, he applied again
and was refused hire. The defendant said at first it was because of the plaintiff’s past
drug use, but ultimately decided to interpose the defense of a neutral policy that
precluded rehiring anyone who had been discharged for misconduct.159 The Court said
that this was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.160
Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was developed by the Court as a defense to
intentional discrimination, disparate treatment, cases under Title VII;161 however, it may
not be an appropriate defense to all disparate treatment cases under the ADA. Any
reason that is not based on the plaintiff’s protected status is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason under Title VII.162 The ADA, however, provides that the employer
may not have a policy that screens out people with the plaintiff’s disability unless the
policy is justified by business necessity.163 Because the no-rehire policy screens out
people with the plaintiff’s disability, the employer should have been required to justify it,
even in a disparate treatment case. However, the Court has now put the burden on the
plaintiff to show that the defendant’s use of the policy was not a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.164
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The Court criticized the court of appeals for conflating the two theories of
disparate treatment and disparate impact in determining that a neutral policy is not a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, if it has a disparate impact on the protected class.165
The Supreme Court is actually the court doing the conflating by treating disparate
treatment under Title VII and disparate treatment under the ADA the same. Under Title
VII, the defendant discriminates if he treats a member of a protected class differently
from a member of another class. Under the ADA, the defendant may be guilty of
discrimination if he doesn’t treat disabled people differently from non-disabled people.166
The employer must offer reasonable accommodation to disabled people.167 In addition,
the non-discrimination requirement of the ADA requires that the employer not maintain
policies that screen out disabled people.168 The Court determined that the latter defense
is implicated only in a disparate impact case.169 This contradicts the decision in Chevron
v. Echazabal, in which the Court allowed the defendant to interpose the business
necessity defense, which is the defense to a disparate impact case, in a case that involved
disparate treatment.170
Having severely restricted the plaintiff’s ability to prove discrimination under the
employment provisions of the ADA, the Court turned to a delineation of “reasonable
accommodation without undue hardship.” The Court’s entry into this area was in a nonemployment case.

3. Cases interpreting reasonable accommodation
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin171 a professional golfer asked for an
exemption from the rule that players must walk instead of use a golf cart in certain
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situations. The plaintiff had a degenerative circulatory disorder that had atrophied his
right leg so that he could no longer walk the golf course. The defendant contended that
exempting the plaintiff from the rule prohibiting the use of golf carts would
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.172
Title III of the ADA applies to public accommodations and has somewhat
different language from Title I that applies to employment. Title III defines as
discrimination the failure to make reasonable modifications unless making such
reasonable modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the “goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodation.”173 However, since fundamental
alteration is a type of undue hardship,174 the case has implications for what a reasonable
accommodation without an undue hardship is under Title I, as well.
The Court said that the use of golf carts is not inconsistent with the fundamental
character of the game, citing their ubiquitous use on golf courses and the rules of golf
followed by most golfers that did not refer to use of carts in describing the object of the
game.175 The defendant contended that “the walking rule is ‘outcome determinative’
because fatigue may adversely affect performance.”176 The Supreme Court did not agree,
but even assuming this to be the case, the Court said that the ADA requires an individual
inquiry into whether the accommodation is reasonable in a particular case. Because the
plaintiff suffers greater fatigue than normal, the purpose of the walking rule would not be
compromised. Thus, modifying a “peripheral rule” would not fundamentally alter the
game.177
Having distributed largesse once again in a non-employment case defining Title
III’s analogue to undue hardship, the Supreme Court proceeded to interpret the Act
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narrowly in its first reasonable accommodation/undue hardship employment case under
the ADA. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,178 the Supreme Court addressed the terms
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” for the first time under the ADA.
The plaintiff’s request for an accommodation required overriding the employer’s
seniority system. The Court decided that overriding the seniority system would not be a
reasonable accommodation in the usual case.179 In reaching this decision, the Court
provided insight, not only into the nature of reasonable accommodation, but also into the
burden of proving reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.
With regard to the burden of proving reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he need only prove that an
accommodation is effective. The Court said that an effective accommodation is not
necessarily reasonable for the business.180 Thus, the employee bears the burden of
proving that an accommodation was reasonable, meaning feasible for the employer in the
usual case. Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the employer must prove that the
accommodation is an undue hardship in the particular case. In the Barnett case, then, the
Court said that a violation of the seniority system would not be a reasonable
accommodation in the usual case, so the employee would have to show special
circumstances in order to prevail on its burden of showing reasonable accommodation.181
In other words, the employee bears the burden of proving not only that he is
disabled but that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation, and also that the accommodation is not unreasonable and not an undue
hardship “in the usual case.” The employer bears no burden of proof unless he has to
show that the accommodation is an undue hardship in this particular case.
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The net effect of the Court’s cases detailed above, in addition to the restrictive
interpretation of reasonable accommodation and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, is
to limit the protected class to employees who are almost totally restricted in a major life
activity, which has to important to the everyday life of most people. Thus, it is difficult
to see who, other than persons who are totally unable to see, hear, or walk, will be
included in the protected class. People with less restricting impairments, such as
alcoholism, are now rarely able to prove that they are disabled.182

IV. Alcoholism under the ADA
Because of the restrictive interpretation of “individual with a disability,” few if
any alcoholics could be considered to be disabled under the ADA and consequently
would not be entitled to the mildest of accommodations to maintain their sobriety. The
alcoholic may be put in the bind of being unable to maintain his sobriety without time to
go to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or counseling. If he relapses, he will be fired
because he is not able to measure up to the requirements of the job. Under the ADA, the
question for alcoholics is 1) whether they are disabled; 2) if they are disabled, whether
they are entitled to reasonable accommodation; and 3) if so, what would be a reasonable
accommodation?
The first problem for purposes of the ADA is, whether an alcoholic, active or
recovering, can ever prove that he is disabled and thus be entitled to any of the
accommodations necessary to secure and maintain his sobriety? In order to prove that he
is disabled, a plaintiff must prove that he has an impairment that substantially limits a
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major life activity and that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation.183
A. Alcoholism and Drug Addiction under the ADA generally
The first question is whether an alcoholic has an impairment. The Regulations
define impairment as a physiological disorder or condition, as well as a mental or
psychological disorder.184 Alcoholism is considered both a physical and psychological
impairment, as discussed above.185 Although scientists disagree as to the exact nature of
the impairment, all agree that it is an impairment of some kind, as recognized by
Congress186 and the Rehabilitation Act.187 As noted, the ADA must provide no less than
the protection afforded by the Rehabilitation Act.
In the ADA, Congress distinguished drug addicts from alcoholics and excluded
active drug addicts from the protection of the Act, as well as employees and applicants
who are currently using illegal drugs.188 However, the protection of the Act is reinstated
if the drug addict has “successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;” “is participating in a supervised
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use;” or “is erroneously
regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use.”189
The employer may forbid the use of alcohol and drugs on the premises and
impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as required of other
employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use or alcoholism of
such employee.190 The ADA also allows employers to institute drug testing to ensure that
a drug addict is no longer using drugs.191
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For purposes of this article, I will treat recovering alcoholics and recovering drug
addicts the same because both are theoretically protected by the ADA. Again, the ADA
also protects active alcoholics, but not active drug addicts.192
The next question in deciding whether the alcoholic, active or recovering, is
disabled is whether his impairment substantially limits him in a major life activity.193
With regard to the question of whether he has an impairment, Congress and the lower
courts have always assumed that alcoholism is an impairment, and, until recently, a per se
disability. The Supreme Court has not always been so generous.

B. Cases on Alcoholism
1. Supreme Court cases
The Supreme Court has not dealt with cases under the ADA that involve
alcoholism, although it did decide a case involving a drug addict, as discussed earlier, in
which the Court did not reach the issue of drug addiction.194 In addition, as discussed
below, the Court has decided one case involving alcoholism under the Rehabilitation
Act.195 Other than that, the Court has decided only one other case involving alcoholism,
and as in all of these cases, the Court has been less than charitable toward alcoholics and
addicts.
Powell v. Texas 196 involved whether an alcoholic could be criminally sanctioned
for public drunkenness. The Court opined in this 1968 opinion that an alcoholic was
better off in jail than out on the street intoxicated.
[F]acilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics are woefully
lacking throughout the country. [footnote omitted] It would be tragic to
return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and frequently
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unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities without even the
opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail term provides.197
This opinion reflects many of the stereotypes the ADA was designed to
ameliorate. Also, it could be argued that the Court’s cabined 1968 view of alcoholics and
the disease of alcoholism might have changed with more advanced medical
understanding of alcoholism as a disease.198 However, several years later, in a case
decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court did not treat alcoholism more
indulgently.
In 1988, in Traynor v. Turnage,199 the question before the Court was whether, in
enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress was rejecting the position it had taken a year
earlier under the law relating to veterans, which denominated primary alcoholism as
“willful misconduct” for which the plaintiffs could lose their benefits. Under the
Veterans Administration Act, the V.A. conclusively presumed that primary alcoholism,
as opposed to alcoholism that is secondary to mental illness, was “willful.” The plaintiff
contended that this conclusive presumption was inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act’s
requirement that mandates an individualized inquiry. In denying their benefits, the
plaintiffs argued that the V.A. was acting based on “generalized determinations that lack
any substantial basis.”200 Even though the Court concluded that it did not have to decide
whether alcoholism is a disease beyond the victim’s control, the Court nevertheless
commented gratuitously that there was:
“a substantial body of medical literature that even contests the proposition
that alcoholism is a disease, much less that it is a disease for which the
victim bears no responsibility." [citation omitted] Indeed, even among
many who consider alcoholism a "disease" to which its victims are
genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not regarded as
wholly involuntary.201
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The Court ultimately concluded that for purposes of veteran’s benefits only, the
Rehabilitation Act does not mandate an individualized inquiry of the factors contributing
to primary alcoholism because Congress and the V.A. have reasonably determined that
no such factors exist.202
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court had taken positions hostile to alcoholism
as a disease for purposes of the criminal law and Veterans’ Administration law, the Court
has not rejected alcoholism as a disease under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
Indeed, virtually all lower courts accepted alcoholism as a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act.203 The lower courts’ position was carried over into early ADA cases,
as well.204
2. Lower court cases on alcoholism under the ADA
Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.,205 decided prior to the
Court’s unfavorable interpretations of the ADA, discussed above,206 demonstrates how
the ADA was supposed to work in the context of alcoholism. The plaintiff was a
recovering alcoholic and drug addict, who was required to give a urine sample for drug
testing. Because he had a medical condition known as neurogenic bladder, he was unable
to provide the required sample in the time allowed and was fired. He conceded that this
condition was not a disability, but argued that his drug and alcohol addiction was. The
court agreed. Although he could not show that he was currently substantially limited in a
major life activity, the court found that he had a record of a disability.
We, moreover, have previously held that "substance abuse is a
'handicap' for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act," [citation omitted.] And
this is highly relevant since the ADA states that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply
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a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [citation omitted] or the regulations issued by
Federal agencies pursuant to such title. [citation omitted]. . . .
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA also indicates that the law
was intended to apply to recovering addicts. The committee reports state
that the term "physical or mental impairment" includes, inter alia, "drug
addiction[ ] and alcoholism." [citations omitted] 207

The plaintiff also had to prove that his addiction substantially limited one or more
major life activities in the past to prove that he had a record of a disability. The court did
not elaborate but concluded that, having shown that he had a record of having an
addiction, it could be assumed that he had met this prong.208 The court ultimately
decided that the company was discriminating against recovering addicts who had the
plaintiff’s bladder condition because they were required to give a urine sample more
frequently. Other people who were not recovering addicts but who had the same bladder
condition were not required to give a urine sample with such frequency. While it would
be an undue hardship for the company to test the plaintiff less frequently because this
would endanger its drug-free workplace status, the company could easily accommodate
the plaintiff by giving him more time to produce the sample.209
The court’s analysis in Buckley illustrates the way the ADA was working, and
was supposed to work, in such a case, but after the Supreme Court’s unfavorable spate of
decisions interpreting the ADA,210 the cases dealing with alcoholism are almost
uniformly holding that the alcoholic plaintiff was unable to prove that he was disabled.211
Although the plaintiff has three ways of claiming protection of the ADA, the
alcoholic plaintiff is currently succeeding in none of these possibilities. As discussed
below, to be a member of the protected class, the plaintiff must prove that he has an
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impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or that he was regarded by the
employer as having such an impairment or that he has a record of such an impairment.
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a. Whether the plaintiff is in the protected class
1) Whether the plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity
After Sutton, the courts no longer hold that alcoholism is a per se disability.212
The trend toward determining that alcoholism is not a disability, however, began prior to
the Sutton case, as some courts began to restrictively interpret the meaning of
disability.213 In a pre-Sutton case, Burch v. Coca Cola Co.,214 the court said that
alcoholism is not a per se disability215 and required the plaintiff to show that his
alcoholism significantly limited a major life activity. The plaintiff said that drinking
affected his ability to sleep, think, walk and talk. The court said that his inability to
perform these functions was temporary and no different from anyone who overindulges
in alcohol. Although his alcoholism was permanent, the effects he referred to were not.
The court said that the plaintiff produced no evidence of permanent alteration of gait,
ability to speak properly, long-term insomnia or memory impairment when sober. He
admitted that his work was not affected and that he never drank during working hours.216
After Sutton, virtually all courts now generally find that alcoholics are not
significantly limited in any major life activity under the Supreme Court’s restrictive
interpretation of that term.217 Alcoholics, especially those in recovery, have difficulty
identifying a major life activity in which they are currently significantly limited. The
most likely major life activity in which alcoholics may claim to be limited in performing
is working, which carries its own baggage, as discussed above.218
The EEOC defines a major life activity as “functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
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working.”219 The regulations indicate that the list is not exhaustive,220 and that generally
“‘major life activities’ are those basic activities that the average person in the general
population can perform with little or no difficulty.”221 A person is “substantially limited
in a major life activity if he is unable to perform or is “significantly restricted as . . . to
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform” that activity.222
Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.223 is a good example of the difficulty of proving
that alcoholism is a disability. In the Bailey case, the plaintiff was an active alcoholic
whose attempts at recovery had been unsuccessful. Despite this fact, he had generally
been able to fulfill his job duties. The plaintiff was eventually jailed for driving under the
influence and asked the defendant to allow him to work on a work-release program. The
plaintiff contended that he was entitled to this as a reasonable accommodation. The
defendant declined and terminated the plaintiff for excessive leave.224
The court decided that the plaintiff was not disabled, even though there is no
question but that alcoholism is “an impairment” under the ADA. However, the court said
that, although alcoholism is not excluded from the ADA, it is treated differently, noting
the requirement that alcoholics be held to the same standards as other employees and that
they can be required to not be under the influence at work.225 The court said that
generally alcoholism is not recognized as a per se disability under the Act, so that the
plaintiff must make an individualized showing.226
The plaintiff contended that he was substantially limited in working, but the court
said that he did not show that he was unable to perform a broad range of jobs. To prove
that he was substantially limited in working, he would have to show that he could not
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“perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to
the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.”227 The court noted
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines228 cast doubt on whether
working should be considered a major life activity.229 The court said that proof that one
is so limited must relate to the relevant geographic area; the numbers and types of jobs in
the area from which the plaintiff is foreclosed; and the types of training, skills and
abilities the jobs require.230 The plaintiff showed only that he had difficulty performing
his job, and even that showing was weak because he was usually able to perform. The
fact that he was incarcerated and unable to perform was short term and not a substantial
limitation.231
Similarly in Boerst v. General Mills Operations, Inc.,232 the plaintiff, a recovering
alcoholic, suffered from anxiety, fatigue, difficulty sleeping, and an inability to
concentrate.233 The court held that he was not disabled. The court said that sleeping and
working are major life activities, but that concentrating and maintaining stamina are not.
The court said that he had to show that either he could not perform a major life activity
that an average person could perform or that his performance was significantly
restricted.234 The court opined that the inability to work more than eight hours a day was
not enough to show disability, nor did this show that he could not perform a wide range
of jobs. With regard to sleeping, the plaintiff showed that he slept only from two to four
hours a night. The court said that this was not sufficient to show that he was substantially
limited in his ability to sleep.235
McKay v. Town and Country Cadillac, Inc.,236 illustrates another plaintiff’s
unsuccessful attempt to identify a substantial limitation in a major life activity. The
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plaintiff argued that he had produced substantial evidence that his alcoholism had a
devastating effect on his family relations and social life. He could not ever for the rest of
his life go to any social event where alcohol was being served. This limited his ability to
develop social relationships and family relationships. The court accepted that the ability
to interact with others does constitute a major life activity, although other courts have
held that it does not.237 However, the court said that the plaintiff was not substantially
limited in his ability to interact with others in any event just because he could not attend
social events where alcohol is served. The court said that a mere alteration in lifestyle
does not constitute a substantial limitation. The question was whether the plaintiff was
“‘significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which he
performed family or social functions as compared to the condition, manner or duration
under which the average person in the general population can perform family or social
functioning.’”238
Alcoholic plaintiffs, indeed most plaintiffs,239 have been unsuccessful in proving
that they are disabled because they are unable to prove that they are sufficiently limited in
a major life activity. The usual problem with alcoholics is that even in recovery, they
may be perceived by employers as unable to perform. Thus, the plaintiff should be able
to proceed under the second prong of the ADA, that the plaintiff was “regarded as”
disabled. Again, the restrictive interpretation of “significantly limited in a major life
activity” virtually eliminates this possibility also.
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2) Whether the plaintiff was regarded as disabled
One of the principal concerns of the ADA was discrimination based on myths and
stereotypes surrounding disabilities. For this reason, Congress prohibited discrimination
against persons who are regarded as disabled, even if they are not.240 The Court in Sutton
recognized only two possibilities for the plaintiff who is trying to prove that he was
regarded as disabled: Either the employee has an impairment that is not substantially
limiting, or the employee has no impairment at all.241 In either situation, the Court said,
the employer must believe that the impairment is substantially limiting in a major life
activity.242 There is a third possibility cited in the regulations243 that the Court did not
cite, and that is that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity because of
the attitude of others to his impairment.244 This regulation was included among those that
interpret the Rehabilitation Act, which were validated for purposes of the ADA.245
Although the language of the statute applies the substantial limitation of a major
life activity to all three prongs;246 nevertheless, the “regarded as” prong should focus
primarily on how the plaintiff is treated and not on the nature of the substantial
limitation.247 As noted, however, most courts require the plaintiff to prove not just that
the employer acted based on stereotypes or misconceptions, but on the belief that the
plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity.248
Consequently, as under the actual disability prong of the disability definition,
plaintiffs proceeding under “regarded as” prong are also being stymied by the
requirement that they must be perceived as substantially limited in a major life activity.
For example, in Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.249 after the court rejected the plaintiff’s
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contention that he was actually disabled, as discussed above,250 the plaintiff argued that
he should be considered disabled under the alternative provisions of the ADA.251 With
regard to whether he was regarded as disabled, the court noted that the Supreme Court
had provided that there were two ways of being regarded as disabled.252 Under neither of
these was the plaintiff disabled because under the major life activity of working, the
employer did not believe that he was disabled in performing anything but his own job.253
What immediately appears obvious is that an employer would not be concerned
with whether the employee could perform anything but his own job. If this is the test, the
employer would not be concerned with whether the employee could not care for himself
or anything else, so this avenue into the protected class would never function. Nielson v.
Moroni Feed Co.254 is a good example. The plaintiff was the president of the company
and was ousted for misconduct. He alleged that he was erroneously perceived as being
addicted to drugs.255 However, the court said, being erroneously regarded as using drugs
illegally is considered a disability only if the plaintiff is perceived to be sufficiently
impaired to substantially limit a major life activity.256 The plaintiff failed to produce
evidence of anyone perceiving him as being limited in a major life activity. The
plaintiff’s contention was that the company thought his alleged drug use was severe
enough to prevent his being able to perform his duties as company president. The court
said that this was insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work
because it is only one job and not a range of jobs.257 The court said the plaintiff must also
show that the employer regarded him as unable to perform in a broad range of jobs, not
just the job he held. The court also cited authority for the proposition that requiring that
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the employer believe that the employee cannot perform a broad range of jobs has
virtually eliminated the “regarded as” claim.258
The Supreme Court in Sutton cited with approval the EEOC’s definition of the
major life activity of working as requiring that the employee could not do a broad range
of jobs,259 even though the Court was skeptical about working being considered a major
life activity.260 What the Court did not note was that the EEOC had indicated in its
guidance that the evidence needed to prove substantial limitation in working should not
be onerous.261 In addition, the guidance provides that one rejected from a job because of
“myths, fears, and stereotypes” would be covered by this prong regardless of whether
others shared this view or not.262 Clearly, the employer’s belief of whether the employee
was able to perform a wide range of jobs or not would be less relevant under the EEOC’s
guidance.
Shiplett v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.263 is an example of how “regarded
as” should work. The plaintiff had been prescribed a highly addictive prescription drug
for a sleep disorder.264 The plaintiff contended that the employer regarded him as
disabled. The court said that the plaintiff had not specified what major life activities the
defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing, so it assumed that
the defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing his job as a
train engineer.265 The court said that several circuits had held that the employer does not
necessarily perceive the employee as being disabled simply because he cannot perform a
particular job.266 The court decided that a broad range of jobs was involved in this case,
however, because if the defendant perceived the plaintiff as unable to perform the
engineer job, then he would be unable to perform a wide range of safety sensitive jobs.267
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Many courts interpret “broad range of jobs” to even require the plaintiff to seek
work outside his profession. For example, in Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System,
Ltd.,268 the plaintiff pharmacist was fired after he went into treatment for drug addiction.
The plaintiff argued that he was regarded as a drug addict. The only feasible major life
activity in which he could argue he was substantially limited was working, and he could
only show that his employer believed that he could not be a pharmacist. The court said
that a broad range of jobs was required, not just the inability to perform in his desired
field, citing similar cases.269
Unless the courts are willing to interpret the term “substantially limited in a major
life activity” more generously, that leaves only the last possibility for claiming protection,
“having a record of a disability.” Even here, the same problem arises; the plaintiff cannot
prove that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life activity.

3) Whether the plaintiff has a record of having a disability
The intent of the “having a record of a disability” prong was to protect one from
discrimination who has a history of a disability or who has been misclassified as
disabled.270 This should be an easier route for alcoholics, who usually have a record of a
disability. However, because having a record of a disability is not defined in the Act, and
the Court has not clarified its meaning under the ADA, the EEOC regulations and
guidances, along with caselaw must be referenced. The EEOC provides that “having a
record of” can mean a history of disability or it can mean an actual documented record,
such as medical, educational or employment records.271 Again, however, the plaintiff has
to prove that he has a record of a substantially limiting impairment. Because the Court
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requires such stringent proof that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life
activity, plaintiffs are having difficulty proving this prong as well.
In Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,272 for example, discussed above, the court
said, with regard to the recovering alcoholic plaintiff, that “having a record of a
disability” is supposed to protect those who have recovered or are recovering from
substantially limiting impairments from discrimination based on their medical history.
Although the plaintiff had a record of an impairment, the court found that he could not
show that he had a record of an impairment that substantially limited him in a major life
activity, such as working.273
In a case decided before Sutton, Burch v. Coca Cola Co.,274 also discussed
earlier,275 the court said that the fact that the alcoholic plaintiff had been hospitalized
would be considered in whether he had a record of a disability, but that the hospital stay
was of insufficient duration to qualify the plaintiff as having a record of a disability.276
This decision is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline,277 in which the Court said that the plaintiff had a record of a disability
because she had been hospitalized.278 Arline was decided under the Rehabilitation Act
and is precedent for the ADA.279
Even if the plaintiff could show that he was substantially limited in a major life
activity, he still has an additional obstacle to overcome to join the protected class:
whether he could perform the essential duties of the job.
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4) Whether the plaintiff is unable to perform the essential functions of the job and
the conflict with the major life activity of working
Title I, which applies to employment, poses additional problems for plaintiffs.
Title I requires, in addition to being disabled, that one still be able to perform the
essential duties of the job. Because of the stringent requirements the Court has imposed
on proving that a person is disabled, Title I probably protects very few people: The
courts require that the plaintiff be so impaired to prove that he is disabled, it is unlikely
that he can perform the essential duties of the job.
As the court said in one case,280 it was “assuming without deciding” that working
is a major life activity because of the conceptual difficulties of the analysis. The
problem, the court said, is that to prove that he is disabled, the plaintiff must prove that he
is substantially limited in his ability to work; however, once the plaintiff shows that his
ability to work is substantially limited, then he probably cannot prove that he is qualified
for the job.281 In other words, in order to prove that he is qualified for the job, the
plaintiff has to prove that his alcoholism does not interfere with his job, which then
contradicts his being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the most
likely major life activity the alcoholic plaintiff can claim to be substantially limited in
performing.
Even if plaintiffs can prove that they are substantially limited in a major life
activity other than working, courts often find that the plaintiff could not perform the
essential functions of the job.282 Several courts have said that showing up to work as
scheduled is an essential function of the job, for example.283 In one case, because the
plaintiff was in jail for driving while intoxicated, he could not show up for work.284 He

42

was terminated for excessive unauthorized absence, which is allowed by the ADA, which
requires the employee to measure up to the employer’s standards.285 Thus, an alcoholic
employee has an even more difficult proof problem because he can be held to the same
performance standards as other employees.286 If he is unable to perform his job because
of his disability, he can be discharged for failing to meet the employer’s performance
standards.287 Because of this provision, most courts effectively relieve the employer of
its obligation to reasonably accommodate.288
Alcoholic plaintiffs often engage in unacceptable behavior, which can serve as the
impetus for getting them into treatment. Because employers are not required to
reasonably accommodate such behavior, the alcoholic plaintiff can be fired without
providing him the generally acceptable reasonable accommodation of leave to go to
treatment.

b. Discharge for reasons related to disability and holding plaintiff to same standards
1) Bad conduct
Although alcoholic plaintiffs’ unacceptable behavior is usually related to their
illness, the courts disconnect the behavior from the illness and attribute the employers’
action to the behavior and not to the plaintiffs’ alcoholism.289 Early ADA and
Rehabilitation Act cases, such as Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.,290
generally held that discharge for misconduct caused by the plaintiff’s alcoholism was
based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff’s disability, so that firing him for the
misconduct was the equivalent of firing him for his disability. The court said it is like a
plaintiff whose limp causes him to make a thump when he walks, and the employer firing

43

him for making the thumping noise.291 Later cases such as Maddox v. University of
Tennessee,292 took a different view. In the Maddox case, the court approved the firing of
a football coach for driving while intoxicated, which the plaintiff alleged was causally
connected to his alcoholism. The Sixth Circuit held there that there is a distinction
between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging someone for his disability.
Otherwise the employer would have to accommodate the plaintiff’s behavior, considered
unacceptable in other employees, because of the plaintiff’s disability. By 2001, the
courts were virtually unanimous in allowing employers to fire employees for misconduct,
even if related to the employee’s disability.293 These decisions ignore the holding in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,294 in which the Supreme Court said that it is
impermissible to distinguish between the effects of a disease and the disease itself.
Nevertheless, because the ADA requires alcoholics and drug addicts to meet the
same performance standards as other employees, the effects of disease can be taken into
account, if the employee is unable to measure up to the employer’s standards.295 In
Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co.,296 the court said
One area, however, where the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act [footnote
omitted] recognize a dichotomy between a disability and disability-caused
misconduct is where the disability is related to alcoholism or illegal drug
use.
....
The reason this dichotomy exists is simple: both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act clearly contemplate removing from statutory protection
unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism and illegal drug use.
Specifically, the ADA states that a covered entity
may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of
drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification
standards for employment or job performance and behavior
that such entity hold other employees, even if any
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the
drug use or alcoholism of such employee. . . . 297
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Thus, employers may fire the employee who is in possession of drugs,298 under
the influence at work,299 excessively absent,300 or driving under the influence. 301
In addition, employers may fire employees for legal consequences suffered from
drinking302 and for various acts of misconduct caused by drinking.303
These holdings have had further effect. Courts used to say that other
disabilities are not treated the same way as alcoholism, so that misconduct caused
by other disabilities should not be cause for discipline.304 Nevertheless, the
treatment accorded alcoholism in this regard has spilled over into other
disabilities, and misconduct is cause for discipline, even if caused by the
plaintiff’s disability other than alcoholism.305
Another difference between alcoholism and other disabilities is that the
employer may impose additional requirements on alcoholic employees who have
sought leave to go to treatment. Many employers require employees to sign
agreements that they will seek no further accommodation; that this is their last
chance.306
2) Violation of last chance agreement
Nelson v. Williams Field Services Co.307 is typical of the last chance agreement
cases.308 The defendant encouraged employees who thought they had an alcohol or drug
problem to come forward and seek help. The plaintiff was concerned about his alcohol
consumption, so he was given time off for treatment if he would sign an agreement that
he would refrain from consuming alcohol and drugs for the duration of his employment
and submit to periodic testing.309 Three years after his return to work, the plaintiff was
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arrested on his own time while driving under the influence of alcohol. The district court
found that the plaintiff had been terminated for violating the agreement not to consume
alcohol or drugs for the duration of his employment, not because he was an alcoholic.310
In fact, the plaintiff was discharged for violating an agreement that he was forced
to enter into in exchange for leave to get help for his impairment, which has generally
been recognized as a reasonable accommodation.311 The agreement made him liable to
discharge for activities that occurred off the job for which other employees would not
have been discharged. Thus, he was treated differently because of his disability, a classic
example of discrimination.312 The plaintiff made this argument in Longen v. Waterous
Co., 313 when he was discharged for violating a last chance agreement. The court rejected
his argument that he had been discriminated against because the last chance agreement
was not imposed on other employees. He also argued that he had been discriminated
against by being subject to termination for any use of mood altering chemicals, even if
not in the workplace, when the employer’s rule only proscribed use of drugs in the
workplace. The court said that the plaintiff agreed to these further restrictions in the last
chance agreement.314
In another case, Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc.,315 the plaintiff was
required to take a breathalyzer test every day after he returned from treatment for
alcoholism. When the plaintiff registered positive on the test, he was fired.316 In
response to the contention that requiring him to take a breathalyzer test was
discriminatory, the court said that it was a rather generous accommodation. Rather than
firing him, the company allowed him to return to work if he would take the test. It was
reasonable for the company to want some assurance that the plaintiff was not under the
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influence because it would affect the safety of the workers who had to work with heavy
equipment. As the court said, “[a]lcoholism is very difficult to overcome . . . .[g]enerally,
one does not undergo treatment for alcoholism and become immediately cured, which is
clear from [the plaintiff’s] own long history of treatment.”317 This is exactly why the
plaintiff needs more than one chance to get into recovery. Requiring him to sign a last
chance agreement when he has only had one chance to get into recovery consigns many
alcoholics to job-loss because relapse is characteristic of the disease. A reasonable
accommodation should include some tolerance for relapse, and employees should not be
discriminated against because they obtained a reasonable accommodation to go to
treatment.318

c. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable accommodation
The issue of reasonable accommodation is complicated by several factors. If the
alcoholic is considered disabled because he is regarded as such or has a record of being
disabled, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.319 Several courts have
held that if the plaintiff is not in fact disabled, but is being discriminated against because
of his record of a disability or because the employer regards him as disabled, the plaintiff
does not need an accommodation.320 The clear language of the Act does not distinguish
among three prongs of the disability definition in requiring reasonable accommodation;
thus, reasonable accommodation should be required for all three prongs, not just in the
case of actual disability.321 An alcoholic has an impairment but is generally unable to
prove that it is substantially limiting. Thus, if he is perceived by his employer as so
substantially limited that he cannot do the job, he should be entitled to a reasonable

47

accommodation to fulfill the purposes of the ADA and to enable him to be a productive
worker.

322

If he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, there are two factors that must be
considered with regard to alcoholics: One is that reasonable accommodation must be
limited so that it does not enable an alcoholic to continue drinking.323 However, an
alcoholic should be sufficiently accommodated to enable him to get into recovery and
stay in recovery by attending counseling and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.324 He
should also be given a second chance if he relapses and not be summarily discharged for
one slip.325
Before the Court’s narrowing of the definition of disability, beginning in 1999,
the lower courts uniformly held that alcoholism was a disability;326 however, even then,
alcoholics were rarely successful in getting a reasonable accommodation beyond time off
to go to treatment.327 The reason for this was the provision of the ADA that allows
employers to impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as
required of other employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use
or alcoholism of such employee.328
In addition, the plaintiff may be allowed only one treatment. In Evans v. Federal
Express Corp.,329 for example, the court said that the plaintiff had already been
reasonably accommodated by being given a leave to go to treatment for cocaine
addiction, so that her second request for leave was not a reasonable accommodation. The
plaintiff said that she would be qualified, if allowed the second leave. The court said that
generally the employer cannot refuse the accommodation and then fire the plaintiff
because of inadequate performance. One consideration is likelihood of success, and the
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court said that the company could consider a second treatment not likely to succeed
because the first one did not succeed. Also the court said that treatments for addiction are
“notoriously chancy.”330 Even though the plaintiff was currently sober, the company
could rely on what it knew at the time. The court said that even if the company
sometimes gave multiple leaves, it was not required to and that the EEOC does not
require multiple leave for treatment for addiction.331 The Court also said that even “in a
more sympathetic setting—a treatment for cluster migraines” the court did not require
multiple leaves.332
For any manifestations of the plaintiff’s illness, there is virtual universal
agreement that the employer does not have to accommodate such things as excessive
absenteeism.333 The refusal of courts to give alcoholics a second chance ignores the fact
that relapse is a symptom of the illness and frequently occurs. The courts, however,
balance the two concerns of not enabling the alcoholic to continue drinking and providing
reasonable accommodation to get into recovery by refusing to give the alcoholic a second
chance, which is often what he needs to get into recovery. It is in giving multiple
chances that the employer would be enabling the alcoholic; failing to give a second
chance ignores the reality of the situation.334 However, most alcoholic employees are no
longer entitled to any accommodation under the ADA, even to go to treatment, because
effectively they are no longer covered by the ADA.

V. Analysis and Proposed Solution
Under the Court’s recent decisions, is an alcoholic, active or recovering, ever
disabled? The impairment must significantly limit him in a major life activity. Because
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this is an individualized inquiry, each active alcoholic must prove the major life activities
in which he is limited. Many active alcoholics have difficulty sleeping, working, driving,
performing manual tasks, or taking care of themselves.335 They may have an assortment
of physical illnesses.336 However, as noted above, most active alcoholics are functional
and able to work,337 so they may not be able to prove that they are “sufficiently limited”
in any “major life activity,” under the Court’s restrictive interpretation of those terms.338
The irony of the Court’s decisions is that only a relatively non-functional active alcoholic
could possibly prove that he is presently disabled and entitled to reasonable
accommodation that could allow him to continue to drink, assuming he could perform the
duties of the job with accommodation. If he does get into recovery, he almost certainly
loses the protection of the Act.
After the Sutton case, the Court must measure a disability in its corrected state.
Thus, the question then becomes, is a recovering alcoholic ever disabled and entitled to
reasonable accommodation? The impairment has to be presently impairing a major life
activity, so the unmitigated state of the impairment is not relevant in determining whether
the employee is presently impaired.339 The only life activity that the impairment in its
mitigated state significantly limits in every case is drinking alcohol.340 Because the Court
has restrictively interpreted major life activity to be an activity that is of central
importance to most people’s lives,341 drinking would likely not be a major life activity.
The people to whom drinking is of central importance are alcoholics, so it is unlikely that
a recovering alcoholic is significantly limited in a major life activity.
If a recovering alcoholic relapses, he can be fired for one or both of two reasons.
First, if he engages in bad behavior connected to his relapse, he can be fired because he
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can be held to the same standards as other employees. Second, in exchange for the
reasonable accommodation of going to treatment, the alcoholic may have been forced to
sign a last chance agreement in which he agrees to more stringent oversight than other
employees. Thus, whether he violates a work rule or not, he can be discharged merely
for relapsing.
Can the employer fire an employee simply because he is an alcoholic, if he has an
impairment that does not significantly limit a major life activity? Under the first prong of
the disability definition, the employee is not presently disabled. He cannot claim this
protection of the Act, so the answer is yes. This is hardly what Congress intended.
Can such an alcoholic prove that he is has a record of a disability? Even here, the
courts have not been generous. If he has been hospitalized for only a short time for his
illness, many courts hold that he does not have a sufficient record of a disability.342 In
addition, he must prove that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life
activity, which is also unlikely, except on the case of very poorly functioning alcoholics.
If his employer fires him because he does not think an alcoholic can perform the
job, can the employee show that he has been regarded as disabled? Even if the employer
believes that the alcoholic employee cannot do the job because of his alcoholism, the
employee will still have to show that he is regarded as unable to perform in a range of
jobs.343 As another author has suggested, there is a statutory directive to view “regarded
as” from the employer’s perspective. “The important role of stigma . . . suggests that an
individual should also be protected under the ‘regarded as’ prong when he experiences
discrimination on the basis of an (actual, past, or perceived) impairment that is ‘regarded’
by society in general as substantially limiting.”344
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Even if the employee proves that he is regarded as disabled or has a record of a
disability, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation,345 so if he needs an
accommodation to attend AA and/or therapy to stay sober, he is out of luck. Thus, he
may be unable to maintain his sobriety and will inevitably become worse.
Using alcoholism as an example, it can be seen that the Supreme Court’s
decisions have effectively eliminated from the application of the ADA at least one
disability that Congress expressly intended to protect. Obviously there are other
conditions that the courts have decided are not legally disabling, although thought before
to be so in every case, such as cancer.346
The Court’s decisions limit the protected class to people who are traditionally
disabled, such as people who are blind, deaf or unable to walk, because they are totally
limited in a major life activity. People with less obvious impairments, such as
alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and mental illness generally may not be limited in a
major life activity under the Court’s narrow interpretation of that term. Nevertheless,
these impairments cause these individuals to be substantially limited in life activities that
may not be recognized because the courts do not think that such activities are central to a
normal person’s daily life.347
The unintended result of the Court’s decisions in the case of alcoholism is to
provide protection only to some functional, but still very sick, active alcoholics who
should be encouraged to enter recovery. Once they are in recovery, they lose protection
of the ADA and become subject to discipline or discharge, if they have to have the
smallest accommodation to remain sober. If they are unable to maintain their sobriety,
they can be discharged for not measuring up to the employment requirements or for
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violating a last chance agreement. Surely this is not the result that Congress intended or
that society would consider desirable. In its zeal to limit the coverage the ADA, the
Supreme Court is limiting the employment protection of the Act to people who cannot, or
in the case of some active alcoholics, should not, be working.
Why have the courts interpreted the ADA so strictly that plaintiffs suing for
employment discrimination under the ADA have to be so disabled that they probably
cannot work anyway?348 One can only speculate. One obvious possibility is that the
Court is generally hostile to employment discrimination cases.349
With regard to the ADA, there are some additional considerations. There are two
problems with regard to the conception of the statute. One problem involves the structure
of the Act, and the other involves the origin of this statute. With regard to the structure of
the Act, the ADA uses the same definition of disability for all categories of coverage, that
the person is substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity.350
Logically, protecting the rights of people who are seeking employment or trying to
maintain employment involves different considerations from protecting rights of people
denied access to public accommodations. It can be argued that people who are denied
access to public accommodations are more likely to be more impaired than people who
are able to work. The Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in this area and has
indicated that it is reluctant to designate “working” as a major life activity,351 even
though the Court has said that “reproduction” is.352 This somewhat schizoid treatment is
reflected in the two cases decided discussed earlier under the ADA’s titles that govern
areas other than employment. In both of these cases, the Court was very generous in its
interpretation of the Act.353 This may be some evidence of the Court’s hostility to
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employment discrimination cases.354 To be more gracious, the problem may be that the
ADA contains a conceptual problem, which requires disability to be viewed more, rather
than less, stringently for the purposes of employment than disability for other purposes.
The goal of Title I was to enable disabled people to work,355 not to put them in the
dilemma of proving that they are sufficiently impaired to be disabled but still able to
perform the essential duties of the job; in other words, that they are almost, but not quite,
too sick to work. However, the Act as written and interpreted allows that outcome.
The other problem is with regard to the origin of the ADA. The ADA’s
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, applied only to the federal government itself or to
entities that consented to enter into a relationship with the federal government, federal
grantees and federal contractors, all of whom were benefiting from the relationship.356
One can only speculate that courts are limiting the ability of plaintiffs to proceed with a
case out of fear of allowing juries to hear these sympathetic cases or to require the
employer to prove undue hardship, which, according to the statute, could be onerous.357
This reluctance may be due to the fact that, as opposed to the Rehabilitation Act, the
defendant is not getting anything in exchange for making a reasonable accommodation
that could be substantially burdensome.358
In addition, as discussed above,359 some provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
required federal contractors and the federal government to take affirmative action to
employ the handicapped, as disabled people were termed then.360 There was a concern
that the employer would have to employ people who could not perform the job, so the
definition of one who is currently handicapped was intended to be stricter than for one
who is discriminated against because he has a record of a disability or because he is
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regarded as disabled.361 When the ADA was drafted, it simply used the Rehabilitation
Act definitions, even though affirmative action was not required by any provision of the
ADA. Nevertheless, the courts did not interpret the Rehabilitation Act as strictly as the
courts have been interpreting the ADA, despite Congress’ express prohibition that the
ADA should not be interpreted less generously than the Rehabilitation Act.362 Judicial
activism is, and has been, cutting in more than one direction lately.363 As one author
concluded, after an empirical study on ADA litigation,
[t]he most sobering hypothesis that emerges from this data is that the
enactment of the ADA may have greatly harmed plaintiffs’ prospects
under a related disability statute-the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On the
effective date of ADA Title I, Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases were faring twice as successfully as would ADA
plaintiffs, over the next decade.364
The solution is for the courts to recognize their obligation to follow the express
intent of Congress and interpret the ADA as generously as they did the Rehabilitation
Act. How can this be accomplished at this point in time with the Supreme Court having
boxed itself into a corner, so that few people are included in the protected class for
employment purposes? Without a legislative solution,365 which seems unlikely, the
solution is to interpret the “regarded as” and “having a record of” provisions as Congress
intended.366 In both, the employer assumes that the person cannot do the job because
either he has a record of a disability or because the employer regards him as being
disabled. If courts follow the intent of Congress, these provisions should be interpreted
more generously to prevent persons from being discriminated against because of
perceived disabilities. These are people who can work, but who are being discriminated
against because the employer thinks they cannot perform the job. Under the Sutton case,
the Court adopted the EEOC’s definition of “working” as a major life activity, which
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requires that the plaintiff be unable to perform a range of jobs.367 In the context of
perceived disabilities, the definition works better than it would under the actual disability
prong because there is no conflict with the employee being qualified to do the job, as
there may be if the employee is claiming to be actually disabled. If the employer believes
that the employee cannot do his job and deals with him accordingly, then the employee
should be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working.368 As the
court in Shiplett v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.369 said, if the employer believed
that the employee could not be a train engineer, then he would be perceived as unable to
do a number of safety sensitive jobs.370 In other words if the employer believes the
employee cannot do the job, then the employer would also believe that the employee
could not do other similar jobs.371 That should be enough to satisfy the Court’s
requirement that the employee be perceived as unable to perform a range of jobs.372
The question then arises, should people who are not actually disabled, but who are
only regarded as or who have a record of a disability be entitled to reasonable
accommodation?373 The answer should be a qualified yes. While it may sound
counterintuitive that a person who is not actually disabled would need a reasonable
accommodation, there is no such limitation in the statute. Reasonable accommodation
applies to all three prongs of the disability definition. Once the person qualifies for the
protected class, the employer must reasonably accommodate any known physical or
mental limitations.374 With the courts’ restrictive interpretation of who is disabled,
reasonable accommodation becomes especially important. This is particularly true in the
case of people who are only able to work because they are using mitigating measures or
require mitigating measures that may necessitate a reasonable accommodation, such as an
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alcoholic who may require some time off to attend treatment, AA and/or counseling or a
diabetic who needs breaks to check his glucose levels.375
If reasonable accommodation were required for people who are only perceived as
disabled or who have a record of a disability, the accommodations would in most cases
not have to be as burdensome as accommodations for those who are actually disabled.
This solution would relieve the courts of their fear that the employer would be severely
burdened by reasonable accommodation because these accommodations should generally
not be burdensome or the person could not be working.

VI. Conclusion
There is another obvious consideration. Everything should not have to be
justified in terms of economic efficiency. The anti-discrimination acts did take into
account the morality of discrimination in forbidding it. Foreclosing disabled people from
employment, even if it is justified in terms of economic efficiency, cannot be justified in
terms of morality. Furthermore, “[t]here is a price—a cost—for securing more important
remedial and social objectives.”376
The courts have restricted the class of persons protected by the ADA to an
unconscionably small number. To rehabilitate the ADA, the courts must protect those
employees who can now be discriminated against with impunity because employers
believe incorrectly that their impairment prevents them from doing the job. Until a
legislative solution is feasible, the courts must accord the ADA its rightful place as a
protector of impaired people who are not in fact too sick to work, but who can now
legally be treated as if they were.
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24
See infra Section IV.B.
25
See Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L.REV. 83, 95 (2000).
26
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). See Samuel R. Bagenstros, Subordination, Stigma,
and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 496 (2000). “The statutory ‘disability’ category
should embrace those actual, past, and perceived impairments that subject people to
systematic disadvantages in society. And the concept of stigma should play an important
evidentiary role.” Id. at 445. The author suggests that such impairments as HIV and
epilepsy should be always be considered disabilities because of their stigmatizing effect,
and that the agencies that administer the Act should be able to identify such impairments.
Id. at 527. Alcoholism should be included in such a list.
27
See Bagenstros supra note 26, at 426. Even physicians have negative views about
alcoholics. Physicians often see alcoholism as a problem of willpower or conduct
because of the lack of attention paid to the disease in medical schools. See Thomas R.
Hobbs, Ph.D., M.D., Managing alcoholism as a disease, Physician’s News Digest, (Feb.
1998).
28
See CARSON-DEWITT supra note 11, at 398.
29
42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c)(4) provides in part as follows:
(c) Authority of covered entity
A covered entity-(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the
workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol
or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the
requirements
established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et
seq.);
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an
alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance
and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory

61

performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such
employee. . . .
30
See infra Section IV.B.2.a.1). Even if he is in active addiction, courts more often than
not find that even then there is no significant impairment of a major life activity. Id.
31
See David Olsky, Let Them Eat Cake: Diabetes and the Americans with Disabilities
Act After Sutton, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 1829, 1847-48 (2000).
32
In the case of alcoholics, these accommodations would include leave to go to
treatment, AA meetings and/or counseling, and a second chance in the event of relapse.
See infra Section IV.B.2.c.
33
Cases usually end today with the court deciding that the plaintiff is not disabled, so
whether he could perform the duties of the job generally does not arise. See infra Section
IV.B.2.a.2)-3).
34
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
35
See infra IV. C. 2. a. 2)-3).
36
See infra Section IV. C. 2. c.
37
As indeed they must under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611-2615
(2000) but not under the ADA. FMLA covers fewer employers than the ADA. 29
U.S.C. § 2611 to 42 U.S.C. § 12111. The fact that intended beneficiaries of the ADA are
protected by another statute is not a satisfactory solution.
38
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS supra note 1, at 141-42..
39
Congress was concerned about the high unemployment rate among the disabled, which
according to one survey was 39%. See Olsky, supra note 31, at 1841.
40
See Bagenstros, supra note 4, at 946-47. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older
Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 229, 238-40 (1990) in which the author discusses occasions when it may be
economically rational to engage in prohibited classification of employees by protected
class which are nevertheless prohibited by law.
41
See Anderson, supra note 25, at 119-120.
42
Id. at 119-20.
43
See Arlene Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong: Giving Effect
to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 592 (1997). In addition, the author notes
that the Supreme Court recognized that “the ‘regarded as’ prong acknowledges that
society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” Id. (citing School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 ( 1987)).
44
Journal of the American Medical Association, Joint Committee of the National Council
on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and the American Society of Addiction Medicine.
(1992) There are some dissident views regarding the disease concept of alcoholism. See
CARSON-DEWITT supra note .11.
45
See BENJAMIN J. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A. SADOCK, 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PHYCHIATRY 969 (7TH ED. 1999)
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
See id. .
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49

See id. “[R}ecovery is a process of trial and error; patients use slips when they occur
to identify high-risk [for relapse] situations and to develop more appropriate coping
techniques. “ Id.
50
Smoking contributes to heart disease, as does being overweight. Obesity is also an
important factor in the development of diabetes. See Russell Blaylock, HEALTH AND
NUTRICIAN SECRETS THAT CAN SAVE YOUR LIFE 181, 220, 287-88 (2002).
51
See, e.g., Hobbs supra note 27. However, these attitudes may be changing. “A recent
Gallup poll found that almost 90 percent of Americans believe that alcoholism is a
disease.” Id.
52
See id. at 958-59.
One finding supporting the genetic conclusion is the threefold to fourfold
in creased risk for severe alcoholic problems in close relatives of alcoholic
persons. . . . .The rate of similarity or concordance for severe alcoholrelated problems is significantly higher in identical twins of alcoholic
individuals than in fraternal twins in most studies. The adoption-type
studies have all revealed a significantly enhanced risk for alcoholism the
off-spring of alcoholic parents, even when the children have been
separated from their biological parents close to birth and raised without
any knowledge of the problems within the biological family.
Id.
53

[Thirty] percent or more of drinkers develop temporary alcohol-related life
problems. Severe, repetitive alcohol-related life impairment (i.e. alcohol
dependence) is observed at some time during the lives of approximately
10 percent of men and 3 to 5 percent of women, with an additional 5 to 10
percent of each sex developing persistent but less intense alcohol-related
life problems that are diagnosed as abuse. Because high levels of alcohol
intake can cause diverse medical and psychiatric problems, it has been
estimated that 20 to 35 percent of people seeking help from a health care
provider have alcohol abuse or dependence. Thus, alcohol-related
problems are very common in society.
Id. at 954.
54
Id. at 958.
55

The common perception of alcohol and drug addiction as self-inflicted
conditions accounts in large part for the social stigma that attaches to
them. . . .The perception is largely unjust; addiction is a disease with a
documented biological mechanism. Tendencies toward addiction may
also have a genetic component, which further undercuts the idea of
voluntariness. . . . [T]he instinct to blame the addict seems particularly
arbitrary and unfair. . . . The underlying hypocrisy behind the blame-theaddict approach is most apparent with respect to alcohol, a product that is
used openly and without shame by most adult Americans. The stigma of
addiction thus does not attach merely to the behaviors giving rise to the
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illness, but to the illness itself. The alcoholic is viewed in some way as
weak—that is, not capable of “handling” a substance that so many others
have the ability to enjoy casually.
Sonja B. Starr, Simple Fairness: Ending Discrimination in Health Insurance
Coverage of Addiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321, 2335-2337 (2002).
56
Id. “[T]he stereotypical alcoholic person who is a homeless bum is very much the
exception rather than the rule, representing only 5 percent of all persons with severe,
recurring alcohol-related difficulties.” Id.. at 954.
57
Id.
58
Alcoholics may be better off asking for a reasonable accommodation under Title VII.
Ironically, reasonable accommodation under the religion provisions of Title VII was
specifically referred to in the ADA as not sufficiently generous to use as an analogy for
reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See infra note 85. However, because of the
difficulties of proving a case under the ADA, an alcoholic plaintiff might be better off
asking for an accommodation to attend AA meetings under Title VII. While AA is a
spiritual, not a religious program, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note at 44-57. its
belief in a power greater than oneself would qualify it as a religion under Title VII. See
C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2006) (religious practices include”moral or ethical beliefs as to what is
right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious
views.”)
59
See supra text accompanying note 49.
60
42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000).
61
See infra notes 203-04.
62
42 U.S.C. § 12101.
63
Id.
64
29 U.S.C. §§ 705(2), 791, 793, 794, 794(a) (2000).
65
See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law As a Model for Amending the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 597, 607-610 (2004).
66
See id. at 604; FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER supra note 2, at 793.
67
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.
68
See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 793 (5TH ED. 2001).
69
Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e (b) (2000) with ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
70
42 U.S.C. § 12102(8). The section provides as follows:
(8) Qualified individual with a disability
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall
be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
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71

42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000). The provision reads as follows:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e 2(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a).
74
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(2)(2000).
75
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(2000). A pre-employment physical examination may only be
conducted after the employer has made an offer of employment and only if all employees
are required to take a physical. The provision imposes other restrictions on how the
information is used.
76
42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(2000) provides that a drug test “to determine illegal use of drugs
is not a medical examination.”
77
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(2000).
78
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (1)(2000).
79
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (6)(2000).
80
42 U.S.C. § 12113 (a)(2000).
81
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
82
The Court has interpreted the reasonable accommodation requirement for religion to
be minimal. See infra note 85.
83
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
84
Id.
73

The term”reasonable accommodation” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals
with diabilities.
Id.
85
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10). (B) Factors to be considered
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
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employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Also in common with Title VII, the ADA has a defense for a religious employer in hiring
persons of a particular religion. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (c) with Title VII.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (c) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
85
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) Title VII also has a requirement that the employer
reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
The requirement for reasonable accommodation under the ADA, however, was intended
to be more difficult to achieve. See US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 422 (2002)
(Ginsberg, J. dissenting) for a discussion of the difference in interpretation. “The
legislative history also specifically rules out the majority’s reliance on Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison . . . . “ (citing “H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68, U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1990, pp. 303, 350 (‘The Committee wishes to make it lcdar that
the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison are not applicable to
this legislation.’); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 35 (same).” Id. TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977) is a Title VII case interpreting reasonable accommodation under that statute. The
dissent in US Airways went on to say that the “House Report singles out Hardison’s
equation of ‘undue hardship’ and anything more than a ‘de minimus [sic] cost’ as being
inapplicable to the ADA.” Id. at n.2.
87

The Supreme Court has nevertheless interpreted the ADA to provide a bona fide
seniority defense in U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
88
42 U.S.C, § 2000-e-2(e) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). The BFOQ defense
under Title VII only applies to sex, religious and national origin discrimination. § 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). Race discrimination cannot be defended as a BFOQ. See
Harris v. Offshore Services, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (J. Ginsburg concurring).
There are other defenses under Title VII that are not contained in the ADA as
well, such as action taken pursuant to a merit system or a system which measures
quantity or quality of production or a professionally developed test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(h) (1988).
89
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). In addition, an employer may refuse to employ one with certain
infectious diseases in food handling occupations. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d).
90
42 U.S.C. § 12209 (5) Enforcement of employment rights
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title
shall be available to any employee of an instrumentality of the Congress
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who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12112
through 12114 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except
that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the
Congress.
The ADA also provides as follows:
(b) Coordination
The agencies with enforcement authority for actions which allege
employment discrimination under this subchapter and under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.] shall develop
procedures to ensure that administrative complaints filed under this
subchapter and under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are dealt with in a manner that avoids
duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting
standards for the same requirements under this subchapter and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Commission, the Attorney General, and
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs shall establish such
coordinating mechanisms (similar to provisions contained in the joint
regulations promulgated by the Commission and the Attorney General at
part 42 of title 28 and part 1691 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations,
and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs dated January 16, 1981
(46 Fed.Reg. 7435, January 23, 1981)) in regulations implementing this
subchapter and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 not later than 18 months after
July 26, 1990.
91

42 U.S.C § 1981a (2000) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights
....
(2) Disability
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies,
and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] (as provided in section 107(a)
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and
section 794a(a)(1) of Title 29, respectively) against a respondent who
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791
of Title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of Title 29, or
who violated the requirements of section 791 of Title 29 or the regulations
implementing section 791 of Title 29 concerning the provision of a
reasonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with
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Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of
section 102(b)(5) of the Act, against an individual, the complaining party
may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection
(b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort
In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a
reasonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)] or regulations
implementing section 791 of Title 29, damages may not be awarded under
this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in
consultation with the person with the disability who has informed the
covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a
reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an
equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)].
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under
this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
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(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
$300,000.
(4) Construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief
available under, section 1981 of this title.
(c) Jury trial
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this
section-(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and
(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations described in
subsection (b)(3) of this section.
(d) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Complaining party
The term "complaining party" means-(A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection
(a)(1) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.);
or
(B) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection
(a)(2) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Attorney General, a person who may bring an action or proceeding
under section 794a(a)(1) of Title 29, or a person who may bring an action
or proceeding under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
[42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 et seq.].
(2) Discriminatory practice
The term "discriminatory practice" means the discrimination described in
paragraph (1), or the discrimination or the violation described in paragraph
(2), of subsection
92
93

42 U.S.C. 1981a(3).
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.
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See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.661 (2001) and Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998).
95
524 U.S. 624 (1998)(the case involved a dentist who offered to treat the patient in a
hospital, but not in his office).
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96

The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW because this was a public
accommodation case, not an employment case. 524 U.S. at 632. The EEOC regulations
in this regard are identical. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
The Court quoted the regs and commented as follows:
“A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
"(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities." 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997).
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list
of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg.
22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a
representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical
impairments, including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic,
visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
mental retardation, emotional illness, and ... drug addiction and
alcoholism." Ibid.
524 U.S. at 632-33.
524 U.S. 633-634.
98
524 U.S. at 638-39 (citing 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)
The dissent disagreed that reproduction is a major life activity, but agreed that this list is
incorporated by reference into the ADA. 524 U.S. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99
524 U..S. at 639.
100
The EEOC regulations have a definition of substantially limited, however. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(ii) (2000).
101
524 U.S. 642-645. The Court said:
97

We find the uniformity of the administrative and judicial precedent
construing the definition significant. When administrative and judicial
interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general
matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial
interpretations as well. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580581, 98 S.Ct. 866, 869-870, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). The uniform body of
administrative and judicial precedent confirms the conclusion we reach
today as the most faithful way to effect the congressional design.
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102

The ADA also requires that in order to be covered by the ADA, the person not pose a
direct threat. The Court ultimately decided that whether the plaintiff posed a direct threat
must be decided based on objective reasonableness, not the health care professional’s
subjective judgment. To make this determination, the Court remanded for more
conclusive evidence. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649.
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524 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); 524 U.S. at 664-65 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part.) In Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999), the Court cited Bragdon
to support its adoption of a strict individualized test:

The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated
"with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an
impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such
individual." § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under the
ADA is an individualized inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
641-642, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (declining to consider
whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA).
104
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
105
527 U.S. at 477-78. For an interesting view on how the Court crafted the decision, see
Mark C. Rahdert, Arline’s Ghost: Some Notes on Working as a Major Life Activity under
the ADA, 9 TEMPLE POL. & C.R. L. REV. 303 (2000).
106
527 U.S. at 481. This statement seems to contradict Bragdon v. Abbott, in which the
Court noted that the Act required it to construe the ADA according to the HEW
regulations defining disability. See supra discussion accompanying note 96. See Lisa
Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the EEOC’s
“Disability” Regulations under the ADA, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177 (2004) for a good
discussion of the issue of the deference owed to the EEOC regulations under the ADA.
107
527 U.S. at 478 (citing § 12102(2))
108
527 U.S.at 481.
109
Id.
110
527 U.S. at 482-83. The Court made this determination by using three provisions of
the ADA:
[1] The Act defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an
individual. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because the phrase
"substantially limits" appears in the Act in the present indicative verb
form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be
presently--not potentially or hypothetically--substantially limited in order
to demonstrate a disability. A "disability" exists only where an impairment
"substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it "might," "could,"
or "would" be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.
A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication
or other measures does not have an impairment that presently
"substantially limits" a major life activity.
71

[2] The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated
"with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an
impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such
individual.". . .The agency guidelines' directive that persons be judged in
their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the
individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA. The agency approach would
often require courts and employers to speculate about a person's condition
and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination
based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment
usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition.
....
[3] Congress found that “some 43 million Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities” . . . Had Congress intended to include all
persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the
Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled
persons in the findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA's
coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated
by corrective measures.
Id.
111

527 U.S. at 489. It should be noted that the Court had said earlier that the EEOC did
not have authority to issue the regulations. Id. at 481. At this point, the guidance suited
the Court’s purpose, so it was assumed without deciding that they were valid. Id. at 49293.
112
527 U.S. at 481.
113
Id. (citing § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The Court further noted:
The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider
when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working. including the geographical area to which
the individual has reasonable access, and "the number and types of jobs
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the
geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified." §§
1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). To be substantially limited in the major life
activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an
individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available,
one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of
different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad
range of jobs.
527 U.S. at 491-92.
527 U.S. at 493.
115
527 U.S. at 492.
116
Id.
114

72

117

See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002).
See supra text accompanying note 96. In addition, “working” was also included in the
list of major life activities from the Senate and House Committee reports on the ADA.
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 439.
119
Bagenstros, supra note 26, at 505. Working is “‘a means of proving yourself worthy
in your own eyes and in the eyes of others’ . . . . People who cannot work because of their
impairments are therefore likely to experience prejudice and neglect.” Id. at 506.
120
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.
121
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
122
“The ADA expressly incorporates the regulations the Executive Branch had
previously promulgated to implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. [citing, inter alia,
42 U.S.C. section 12201(a) (1994)] Even if the regulations promulgated under the ADA
were not themselves entitled to deference, therefore, the Court has made clear that the
substantively identical regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation act would
nonetheless provide a floor below which the ADA’s coverage could not drop.”
Bagenstros, supra note 26, at 409-10.
118

123

“The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated "with
respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an impairment
substantially limits the "major life activities of such individual." § 12102(2).
Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized
inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-642, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141
L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (declining to consider whether HIV infection is a per se
disability under the ADA).” 527 U.S. at 483.
124
See supra discussion accompanying notes 101-103.
125
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642.
126
527 U.S. at 495-513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127
527 U.S. at 482-83. “The Court majority can be criticized for overrelying on an
estimate of the number of people with disabilities, an estimate whose validity was
questioned by its own sources. [footnote omitted] Congress’s reference to 43 million
individuals with disabilities should be seen as a signal of inclusion, not exclusion.”
Anderson, supra note 25, at 107. In addition, the 43 million figure was derived from
sources that define disability differently from the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See
Lisa Eichhorn, Applying The ADA To Mitigating Measures Cases: A Case of Statutory
Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1113 (1999).
128
527 U.S. at 513-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129
527 U.S. at 503-04.
130
The third case decided along with Sutton was Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527
U.S. 516 (1999) in which the court affirmed the lower court that the plaintiff was not
disabled by hypertension because of mitigating measures. In addition, the Court
reiterated the holding in Sutton that to be “regarded as disabled” in the major life activity
of working, the plaintiff would have be foreclosed from a range of jobs. In this case, the
plaintiff was regarded as unable to perform a mechanics’ job that also required driving a
commercial vehicle, but he could perform other mechanic’s jobs.
131
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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527 U.S. at 558-559.
The Act allows employers to rely on governmental requirements. See infra note 191.
134
527 U.S. at 560.
135
527 U.S. at 558-59.
136
527 U.S. at 575-76.
137
527 U.S. at 564-67.
138
527 U.S. at 564 [emphasis added] (citing Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc., 143 F.3d
1228 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court said that the lower court had cited the EEOC
definition of "substantially limits" which requires a “significant restriction as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." 527 U.S. at
563-64 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)). The lower court had also said that
“Kirkingburg’s inability to see out of one eye affects his peripheral visions and his depth
perception. Although his brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with
this visual impairment and thus his body compensate for his disability, the manner in
which he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see.” 143 F.3d
at 1232.
139
527 U.S. at 565.
140
527 U.S. at 565-66.
141
527 U.S. at 566. The Court said “That category, as we understand it, may embrace a
group whose members vary by the degree of visual acuity in the weaker eye, the age at
which they suffered their vision loss, the extent of their compensating adjustments in
visual techniques, and the ultimate scope of the restrictions on their visual abilities. These
variables are not the stuff of a per se rule. While monocularity inevitably leads to some
loss of horizontal field of vision and depth perception, [footnote omitted] consequences
the Ninth Circuit mentioned, [citation omitted] the court did not identify the degree of
loss suffered by Kirkingburg, nor are we aware of any evidence in the record specifying
the extent of his visual restrictions. 527 U.S. at 566-67.
142
527 U.S. at 567.
143
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
144
534 U.S. at 187-190. The parties disagree about how this came about. The plaintiff
alleges that she was forced to continue doing the duties that caused her condition to
worsen. The defendant contends that she started missing work and was fired for poor
attendance. 534 U.S. at 189-90.
145
534 U.S. at 191.
146
534 U.S. at 192. The Court expressed no opinion on whether working, lifting, and
other life activities preserved for appeal below were major life activities.
147
534 U.S. at 197. See supra note 127.
148
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
149
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 [emphasis added].
150
534 U.S. at 202.
151
Id. See supra discussion accompanying note 89. See Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and
Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 33 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 321, 325 (2002), for a good discussion of how
133
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restrictively the courts are interpreting major life activity and Eichhorn supra note 106
for a discussion of the how the Court’s failure to defer properly to EEOC regulations and
guidelines caused it to adopt a much more restrictive view of “substantially limited.”
152
536 U.S. 73 (2002)
153
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
154
42 U.S.C. §12113(b).
155
536 U.S. at 78-79.
156
536 U.S. at 79-87. See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major
Life Activities: The Failure of the “Disability Definition in the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1417-18 (1999) and Bagenstros, supra
note 4, at 933 for discussions of the disability movement’s concern regarding
paternalism.
157
Compare the Court’s treatment of the EEOC’s regulations with regard to working in
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 with the Court’s treatment of the EEOC guidances with regard to
mitigating measures Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
158
540 U.S. 44 (2003).
159
540 U.S. at 54-55.
160
Id.
161
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Legitimate non-discriminatory
reason is a judicially-created defense to a disparate treatment case that the Court
developed under Title VII. Because Congress provided little guidance for analyzing a
circumstantial evidence case of disparate treatment under Title VII, See Judith J. Johnson,
Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate the Reasonable
Factors Other than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L.
REV. (2004), the Court developed the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense as the
model of proof for disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). In establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that 1) he was a
member of a protected class; 2) he applied and was qualified for a position for which the
employer was seeking applicants; 3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 4) the
employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications. Id. at 802.
Once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that the reason given by the employer
was not the true reason for the employer’s action, but rather was a pretext for
discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514–15 (1993). In that case,
the Court said that the trier of fact may resolve the ultimate issue of discrimination vel non
based on its disbelief of the employer’s reason for its action, but that such disbelief does not
necessarily satisfy the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving discrimination. Id. The plaintiff
must prove not only that the employer’s reasons were untrue, but that they were a pretext for
discrimination. Id. at 514–15.
162
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
163
See supra discussion accompanying notes 77-79.
164
The lower court was correct in holding that because the no re-hire policy screened out
former drug addicts, who are protected under the act, the no-hire policy could not be a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason. 536 U.S. at 518. The Supreme Court reiterated its
previously stated conclusion that legitimate non-discriminatory reason means any reason
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that does not discriminate on its face; thus a neutral policy will always serve as a defense.
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (a case decided under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, in which the Court noted that a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason or a “factor other than age” can be any reason, regardless of
how improper or illegal, as long as it does not violate the particular act under which the
plaintiff is suing. Id. at 610-11.) The defendant’s neutral policy in the Raytheon case was
thus a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the plaintiff must prove is a pretext for
discrimination. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 520.
165
536 U.S. at 519. The district court had characterized the plaintiff’s attack on the
employer’s employment policy as based on the disparate impact theory and foreclosed
the argument because of timeliness. In fact, the defendant had not interposed the neutral
employment policy as the reason for its action until later in discovery, at which time the
court would not allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint and allege disparate impact.
Id. at 517. The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact theory under Title VII in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to preclude the use of neutral practices
and procedures that disproportionately impact the protected class. Id. at 430. Such
practices can be defended if the defendant can prove that they are job-related and
consistent with business necessity. See Johnson, supra note 161, at 1410 for a discussion
of disparate impact under Title VII. Unlike the model of proof for disparate treatment,
however, the model of proof for disparate impact is codified in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(6)(2000).
On remand, the court decided that there was enough for a jury to believe that the
employer was discriminating based on the plaintiff’s alcoholism and not because of a
neutral policy. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564 (2004).
166
See Michelle T. Friedland, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA’s “Major Life Activity”
Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 173-76 (1999)
167
42 U.S.C. § 12102(8)(2000).
168
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)(2000).
169
This is a fairly critical limitation because the employer bears the burden of justifying
his employment policies. The Court seems to indicate that the employer only bears this
burden, if the case is classified as a disparate impact case. If, as here, the plaintiff
contends that he was discriminated against because of his disability, and the defendant
contends that he used a neutral employment policy, the burden of persuasion should not
remain on the plaintiff to prove that the policy is a pretext for discrimination, rather the
burden should shift to the defendant to defend the policy. It should be noted that in
Chevron v.Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), the Court did not limit to a charge of disparate
impact the defense of proving that the employee posed a direct threat. For a discussion of
this case, see text accompanying notes 152-57.
What should the plaintiff have done in this case? He could have amended his
complaint, if he had known in time that the defendant was relying on a neutral policy. If
he had relied on alternate theories and his case had been characterized as disparate
impact, he would have lost his right to recover damages, which are available only in
disparate treatment cases. See supra note 91. Traveling only under the disparate
treatment theory, the plaintiff would have lost, if the employer had shown that the policy
was not a pretext for discrimination, even though the employer is expressly foreclosed by
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the ADA from having such a policy. On remand, the lower court decided that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was discriminated against on the
basis of his addiction. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568-69
(2004).
170
536 U.S. 73 (2002).
171
532 U.S. 661 (2001).
172
532 U.S. at 666-671.
173
532 U.S. at 682.
174
See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1841. In Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979), the Supreme Court said that making a fundamental
alteration is an undue hardship. Also, the EEOC guidance provides that “‘[u]ndue
hardship” refers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive,
substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature of the business or
operation.” 29 CFR 1630.2(p) (2006)(emphasis added).
175
532 U.S. at 683-85.
176
532 U.S. at 688.
177
532 U.S. at 690. The dissent is interesting:
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some legal
obligation to play classic, Platonic golf. . . . then we as Justices must
confront what is indeed an awesome responsibility. . . . It has been
rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States . . . to
decide What is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution, aware
of the 1457 edict of James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it
interfered with the practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or later
the paths of golf and government, the law and the links, would once again
cross and that the judges of this august Court would some day have to
wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential question . . . : Is someone riding
around a golf course from shot to shot really a golfer? . . . .
Either out of humility or out of self respect (one or the other) the Court should
decline to answer this incredibly difficult or incredibly silly question.
532 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
179
The Court said that whether collectively bargained or unilaterally imposed by the
employer, seniority systems provide “important employee benefits by creating, and
fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.” The Court said lastly that
the most important consideration was that if the employer were to have to justify its
seniority system in the usual case that that in itself would undermine employee
expectations. The Court did leave open the possibility that if the seniority system was not
administered in such a way as to raise employee expectations, then there could be special
circumstances in which a violation of the seniority system would be a reasonable
accommodation. 535 U. S. at 404-05.
The case had a promising beginning; the Court began by rejecting the employer’s
argument that a reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to provide
178
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preferential treatment to a disabled employee. The Court said that the Act does require
that a disabled employee be treated preferentially to be able to perform; thus, the
employer may be required to make exceptions to neutral rules for a disabled employee,
and such exemptions are not per se unreasonable accommodations. 535 U.S. at 397-98.
The Court, however, singled out a seniority system for special treatment. The Court said
that in the usual case, overriding the seniority system would not be a reasonable
accommodation. The Court cited several bases for its decision. First, the Court cited
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63 (1977) for the proposition that under
Title VII, an exemption from a seniority system is never a reasonable accommodation.
However, as the dissent points out, Title VII contains the express defense of bona fide
seniority system, while the ADA chose not to include such a defense. Furthermore, as
the dissent notes that the legislative history makes it clear that the Hardison was not to
serve as precedent for undue hardship under the ADA. 535 U.S. at 421-423 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). As further justification for its decision, the Court then cited lower court
holdings under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA that collectively bargained seniority
systems could not be overridden to provide a reasonable accommodation. 535 U.S. at
404. As the dissent also points out, this ignores legislative history to the contrary, that
seniority systems would only be a factor in whether the accommodation was reasonable.
Id. at 421.
180
535 U.S. at 399-401.
181
535 U. S. at 402-403.
182
See infra Section IV.B.2.
183
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(2000).
184
The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW because this was a public
accommodation case, not an employment case. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 632. The
EEOC regulations in this regard are identical. See supra note 96. The Court in Bragdon
quoted the regulations and commented as follows:
“A) any physiological disorder or condition, any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or
"(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities." 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997).
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list
of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg.
22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a
representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical
impairments, including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic,
visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
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muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
mental retardation, emotional illness, and ... drug addiction and
alcoholism." Ibid.
524 U.S. at 632-33.
185
See Hobbs supra note 27.
186
Congress included specific provisions in the ADA regarding alcohol and drug addicts.
See supra note 29 and infra note 188. From these provisions, it can be seen that
Congress was assuming that alcoholics and drug addicts would be covered and made
special provisions for them, clearly wanting to protect those who were in recovery.
187
See infra notes 203-04.
188
See Reese John Henderson, Jr., Addiction as Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics
and Drug Addicts under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VANDERBILT L.
REV. 713 (1991) for a discussion of the origin of the distinction.
The definition of disability excludes one who is currently using illegal drugs. 42 U.S.C.
§12114 provides as follows:
For purposes of this subchapter, the term "qualified individual with a
disability" shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the
basis of such use.
(b) Rules of construction
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as a
qualified individual with a disability an individual who-(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been
rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer
engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in
such use;
except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to
adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not
limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in
paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
(c) Authority of covered entity
A covered entity-(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the
workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol
or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the
requirements
established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et
seq.);
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(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who
is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job
performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if
any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or
alcoholism of such employee; and
(5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the
illegal use of drugs, require that-(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are
employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying
with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in
such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are
employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the
Department of Defense);
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered
entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including
complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive
positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered
entity who are employed in
such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission); and
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered
entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such
regulations, including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply
to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of
employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as
defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation).
(d) Drug testing
(1) In general
For purposes of this subchapter, a test to determine the illegal use of drugs
shall not be considered a medical examination.
(2) Construction
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or
authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job
applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on such
test results.
(e) Transportation employees
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit,
restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to-(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions
involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for onduty impairment by alcohol; and
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(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and onduty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safetysensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section.
189

42 U.S.C. §12114(b)(2000). The courts are being hard on the addict in this regard
also. For example, in Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001), the
plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to
participate in a treatment program. Her employer fired her for her absence during the
treatment program. The court said that she was not entitled to the safe harbor provision
of the ADA that extends protection to employees who are participating in a treatment and
are no longer using drugs. The court held the provision only applies to employees who
have refrained from using drugs for a significant period of time. Thus, under this
interpretation, the safe harbor provision will never apply.
190
42 U.S.C. §12113(c)(2000).
191
The ADA allows drug testing of applicants, which is not forbidden as a medical
examination. Furthermore, the ADA provides that
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or authorize the
conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job applicants or employees or
making employment decisions based on such test results.
There are other provisions regarding compliance with various other federal laws and
regulations.
(5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the
illegal use of drugs, require that-(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are
employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying
with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in
such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are
employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the
Department of Defense);
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered
entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including
complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive
positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered
entity who are employed in
such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission); and
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered
entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such
regulations, including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply
to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of
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employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as
defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation).
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c).
Furthermore, the Act provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit,
restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to-(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions
involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for onduty impairment by alcohol; and
(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and onduty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safetysensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section.
42 U.S.C. §12113(c).
192

Illegal drug users face different problems under the ADA. For example in Salley v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977 (3d Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was fired for
misconduct relating to his drug use. He was determined to be a current user of illegal
drugs at the time of his discharge. While he was treatment for the drug use, he gave the
company a written statement regarding his drug use. The company fired him when it
learned in the statement that he had used illegal drugs. The court said that the company
could fire him for drug-related conduct, and that his participation in the treatment
program did not protect him because he was an illegal drug user at the time of the
misconduct. The court noted that “current user” includes people whose abstinence is
longer than the plaintiff’s three weeks. The court cited cases that the plaintiff is a current
user even if abstinent for one year. 160 F.3d at 980 n.2.
In Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was the
president of the company and was terminated for misconduct. He alleged that he was
erroneously perceived as being addicted to legal drugs. 162 F.3d at 606. The Board of
Directors told him that they thought he had a drug problem and that he was going into
homes to steal drugs. He was evaluated and was determined to be a drug addict. The
Board discharged him for trespassing into private homes. The court said that the mere
status of being an illegal drug user may be protected, but the protection is not extended to
one currently using drugs. If an addict has used drugs in the weeks or months prior to his
discharge, he is a current user and not protected unless he has successfully completed a
drug rehabilitation program and or is participating in such a program and is no longer
using illegal drugs or if he is erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs. 162 F.3d at
609-610. However, being erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs is only considered
a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity. 162 F.3d at 611. The plaintiff
failed to produce evidence of anyone perceiving him as being limited in a major life
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activity. The plaintiff’s contention is that the company thought his alleged drug use was
severe enough to prevent his being able to perform his duties as company president. The
court said that this is insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work
because it is only one job and not a range of jobs. 162 F.3d at 611-12. In any event, he
was not discharged because of his perceived addiction, but because of his unexplained
trespass into peoples’ houses. 162 F.3d at 612. It was clear, the court said, that he was
discharged for his misconduct and not because the company thought he was a drug
addict. 162 F.3d at 613.
In Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999), the plaintiff
pharmacist was fired after he went into treatment for drug addiction. First, the court said
that the plaintiff was a current user of illegal drugs because he was informed of the
decision to fire him five weeks after he went into treatment, citing cases that held that six
weeks (citing McDaniel v. Baptist Medical Center, 877 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1995));
and three weeks (citing Shafer v. Preston Memorial Hospital Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278
(4th Cir. 1997)) amounted to current use. 176 F.3d at 856-57. He was not entitled to the
protection of the safe harbor provision because he had not completed a treatment program
and had not been drug-free for a significant period of time. 176 F.3d at 857.
Furthermore, he was not qualified to perform his job because his drug addiction would
undermine the integrity of the hospital pharmacy. The hospital was entitled to consider
the relapse rate for cocaine users, which is high, in its assessment of whether he was
qualified. 176 F.3d at 858. As an alternative ground, the court said that he was not
disabled under the ADA in any event. The plaintiff argued that he was regarded as a drug
addict. The court said that he had to show that he regarded as being substantially limited
in a major life activity. The only available major life activity was working, and he could
only show that employer believed that he could not be a pharmacist. The court said that a
broad range of jobs was required, not just the inability to perform in the his desired field,
citing similar cases: Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (1998) (plaintiff could not
work as Addiction Technician because of her seizure disorder); Bridges, 92 F.3d at 335
(plaintiff’s hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter). 176 F.3d at 860.
193
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000). See supra note 71 for the full text of this provision.
194
As discussed earlier, in Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), the Court said
that the plaintiff did not show that the employer’s reason for refusing to rehire him, that
he had engaged in misconduct, was a pretext. 540 U.S. at 53-54.
195
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988). See discussion infra notes 199-204.
196
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
197
392 U.S. at 528.
198
See supra Section II. Commenting on the disease concept of alcoholism, the Court
noted:
[T]he inescapable fact is that there is no agreement among members of the
medical profession about what it means to say that “alcoholism” is a
“disease.” One of the principal works in this field states that the major
difficulty in articulating a “disease concept of alcoholism” is that
“alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none.”
[footnote omitted] This same author concludes that “a disease is what the
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medical profession recognizes as such.” [footnotes omitted] In other
words, there is widespread agreement today that “alcoholism” is a
“disease,” for the simple reason that the medical profession has concluded
that it should attempt to treat those who have drinking problems. There the
agreement ends. Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether
“alcoholism” is a separate “disease” in any meaningful biochemical,
physiological or psychological sense, or whether it represents one peculiar
manifestation in some individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders.
[footnote omitted].
392 U.S. at 522.
199
485 U.S. 535 (1988).
200
485 U.S. at 550.
201
Id.
202
485 U.S. at 551.
203
See, e.g., Duda v. Board of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998) (assuming
alcoholism is a disability).
In Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995), the court said it is well settled that
alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 752 (citing Cook v. Dept of
Mental Health, 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993); Little v. FBI 1 F. 3d 255, 257 (4th Cir.
1993); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F. 2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
246 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62
F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) (assuming without deciding that alcoholism is a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act).
204
In Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the court said “it is well-established that
alcoholism meets the definition of a disability.” Id. at 1105.
In Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 2000) in which
the court held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
the court noted that
Our determination that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation
Act may be relevant to a determination of whether alcoholism is a
disability under the ADA. [citation omitted] "Congress adopted the
definition of [the] term ['disability'] from the
Rehabilitation Act definition of the term 'individual with handicaps.' By so
doing, Congress intended that the relevant caselaw developed under the
Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 'disability' as used in
the ADA." [citation omitted]
Several circuits have held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA.
See, e.g., Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1180 (6th Cir.1997);
Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 127 F.3d 270, 273 (2d
Cir.1997), vacated en banc on other grounds, 155 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.1998);
Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820, 823 n. 5 (8th
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Cir.1997); Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair
Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105 (Fed.Cir.1996); cf. Despears v.
Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that the
parties did not deny that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA).
Whether alcoholism is a disability per se may raise additional issues. See
Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding
that alcoholism is not a per se disability under the ADA and evidence that
alcoholics, in general, are impaired is inadequate to show the substantial
limitation of one or more major life activities), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1084, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998); see also Wallin v.
Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d
681, 686 n. 4 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Burch and requiring that a plaintiff
show impairment of a major life activity), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004, 119
S.Ct. 1141, 143 L.Ed.2d 209 (1999); Buckley, 127 F.3d at 274 (citing
Burch and requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate both "that he was actually
addicted ... and that this addiction substantially limited one or more of his
major life activities").
203 F.3d. at 730 n.2 and n3.
205

127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997).
See supra Section III. B..
207
127 F.3d at 273.
The reports also make clear that "[i]n removing protection for persons who
currently use illegal drugs, the Committee does not intend to affect
coverage for individuals who have a past drug problem or are erroneously
perceived as having a current drug problem." [citation omitted] Finally,
the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission's Americans With
Disabilities Act, Title I Technical Assistance Manual ("EEOC Manual")
states that "[p]ersons addicted to drugs, but who are no longer using drugs
illegally and are receiving treatment for drug addiction or who have been
rehabilitated successfully, are protected by the ADA from discrimination
on the basis of past drug addiction. [citation omitted].”
Id.
208
127 F.3d at 274.
209
127 F.3d at 274-75.
210
See supra Section IV.B.1.
211
Again, alcoholism is just an example, the ADA does not function as it should with
regard to many impairments, previously considered to be per se disabilities. See,e.g.,
cases cited infra note 239; Olsky, supra note 31.
212
See, e.g., Nelson v. Williams Field Services Co., 216 F.3d 1088 (Table), 2000 WL
743684 (10th Cir. 2000) (Unpublished).
213
See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How
Individualizing the Determination of ‘Disability’ Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV.
327 (1997).
206
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214

119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
119 F.3d at 315.
216
Id. at 316 n.9.
217
See, e.g., Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 2003 WL 1873519 (N.D. Ill.
2003)(in which the court said that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in such major
life activities as sleeping and communicating.)
218
See supra discussion accompanying notes 112-17.
219
29 CFR 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2006).
220
Indeed the Supreme Court has indicated such, in its determination that reproduction is
a major life activity. See Bryan P. Stephenson, I’m So Lonesome I Could Cry. . . .But
Could I Sue? Whether Interacting with Others Is a Major Life Activity Under the ADA,
31 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 2004 for a discussion of various life activities the courts have held
to be major or not.
221
29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006).
222
Id.
223
306 F. 3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
224
Id. at 1164-65.
225
Id. at 1167 n.4.
226
Id. at 1167-68.
227
Id. at 1168 (quoting EEOC guidelines).
228
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
229
Bailey, 229 F.3d. at 1168 n.5.
230
Id. at 1168 (citing the EEOC guidelines).
231
Id. at 1169.
232
25 Fed. Appx. 403 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished).
233
The plaintiff was concerned that all this would cause him to relapse into active
alcoholism. Id. at 403. He was excused from overtime and allowed to work no more
than eight hours a day. When the employer required that he work more than eight hours a
day, he filed a complaint. Id. at 405.
234
Id. at 407. He was unable to show that he was substantially limited in working
because he did not make this showing with regard to a broad range of jobs. Id. Finally,
he testified that taking an antidepressant had pretty much solved his problems, so since
mitigating measures must be considered in determining whether one if disabled, he was
not. Id.
235
Id.
236
2002 WL 1285065 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (unpublished).
237
2002 WL at *4 (citing Solieau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 37 (D. Me.
1996); cf. Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D. Pa.
2000) in which life style changes were sufficient to be substantially limiting.
238
2002 WL at *4. The plaintiff also contended that the court ignored evidence that it
said was not presented. That his recovery support groups required his absence from his
family for 4-5 hours a day in early recovery. Added to his work requirement, this left no
time for his family. He also alleged that he had no time to form friendships. The plaintiff
also alleged substantial limitation in ability to care for himself because he has to limit his
intake of food to food that does not contain alcohol. He also contended that he was
215
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substantially limited in his ability to reproduce for fear of passing on the disease. Even if
there were a genetic link which the plaintiff did not prove, the plaintiff did not present
sufficient evidence that he is not substantially limited in reproduction. 2002 WL at *13.
The plaintiff had two children born after he established his pattern of alcohol abuse. In
any event, the court said, the decision not to reproduce cannot turn on personal choice.
2002 WL at *15.
239
Since the Court’s restrictive interpretation of disability, all plaintiffs have had
problems proving that they were substantially limited in a major life activity. For
example, in Waldrip v. General Electric Co., 325 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff
had chronic pancreatitis and was allegedly fired when his employer saw the warning on
his medication that he should not work around heavy machinery when taking it. The
court said that he did not prove he was disabled. The plaintiff said that the disorder,
which can cause bleeding, tissue death and even pancreatic cancer, substantially limits his
ability to eat and digest. The court was willing to concede that eating is a major life
activity, but that the plaintiff did not produce evidence that he was substantially limited in
his ability to eat. 652 F.3d at 654-55. The court then cited other similar cases in which it
had found that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major life activity.
The court cited the following cases in which plaintiffs were not substantially
limited in their ability to work, beginning with cancer and its treatment not limiting the
ability to work. Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996). In
addition, the court added the following:
See, e.g., Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d
398, 401 (5th Cir.2002) (holding HIV not a substantial limit on major life
activity of reproduction); Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., Inc.,
242 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir.2001) (holding back injury not a substantial
limit on major life activities of sitting, standing, or working); Talk, 165
F.3d at 1025 (holding deformed leg not a substantial limit on major life
activities of walking or working); Still, 120 F.3d at 52 (holding monocular
vision not a substantial limit on major life activity of working); Robinson
v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (holding
asbestosis not a substantial limit on major life activity of breathing);
Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 727 (holding permanent arm injury not a substantial
limit on major life activity of working).
Id. at 656 n5.
It is little wonder that defendants are currently winning 90% of the cases. Colker,
Winning and Losing, supra note 5, at 240..
240
See Mayerson supra note 43, at 592. See Thomas Simmons, Working With the ADA’s
“Regarded as” Definition of a Disability, 5 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 27 (2000) for a good
discussion of the origin and interpretation of the “regarded as” prong.
241
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
242
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
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243

The EEOC took these regulations directly from the regulations issued by HEW under
the Rehabilitation Act. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 434-35. The Supreme Court has
recognized the authority of the regulations issued by HEW. Id.
244
See ????? for a discussion of this omission, in which the author asserts that Congress
intended for the “regarded as” prong to be interpreted expansively.
245
Id.
246
See Eichhorn, supra note 156, at 1432-33.
247
See Burgdorf supra note 15, at 435.
248
See Mayerson, supra note 43, at 591.
249
306 F. 3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
250
See supra text accompanying notes 223-31.
251
Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169.
252
See supra text accompanying note 111 for a discussion of Sutton in this regard.
253
Id. Similarly, in Burch v. Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305 (1997), also discussed above,
the plaintiff alternatively argued that he was “regarded as disabled.” The court said
“‘One is regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if the individual (1) has
an impairment which is not substantially limiting but which the employer perceives as
constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) has an impairment which is
substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment;
or (3) has no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially
limiting impairment.’” Id. at 322 (citing Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th
Cir. 1996)). There was no evidence that the employer regarded him as substantially
limited in a broad range of jobs, as required. While the employer may have been
concerned about his inappropriate behavior, there was no evidence that this was regarded
as substantially limiting. In addition, there was no evidence that the employer discredited
letters from his doctors that he would be able to refrain from such behavior. However,
even if the employer regarded his alcoholism as an impediment, there was no showing
that the employer regarded him as significantly limited in his ability to perform an entire
class of jobs, just his job as an area service manager with responsibility for 20 employees.
Id. at 322-23.
254
162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998).
255
162 F.3d at 606. The Board of Directors told him that they thought he had a drug
problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs. He was evaluated and was
determined to be a drug addict. The Board discharged him for trespassing into private
homes.
256
162 F.3d at 611.
257
162 F.3d at 611-12. In any event, he was not discharged because of his perceived
addiction, but because of his unexplained trespass into peoples’ houses. 162 F.3d at 612.
It was clear that he was discharged for his misconduct and not because the company
thought he was a drug addict. 162 F.3d at 613.
258
358 F.3d at 118 n.4. (citing McGowan, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 27, 123 (2000); Center and
Imparato, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 321, 328 (2003)).
259
29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006), which provides that:
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working—
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(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities.
The ability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working:
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the
following factors may be considered in determining whether an individual
is substantially limited in the major life activity of “working”:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which
the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of
jobs);
and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from
which the individual is also disqualified because of that impairment (broad
range of jobs in various classes).
260
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
261
See Burgdorf supra note 15, at 454 (citing Equal Employment Opportunities for
Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,728 (1991).
262
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. § 1630, app. A 1630.2 (j).
263
182 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 1999) 1999 WL 435169 (unpublished).
264
1999 WL 435169 *1.
265
Id. at *7.
266
Id. at *8. (citing Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992); Forrisi v.
Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)).
267
Id. at *8. (The court ultimately held that the plaintiff was a direct threat to safety and
thus unqualified).
In Avery v. Omaha Public Power District, 187 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999), the court
said that after Sutton, to prove that he is regarded as disabled, the plaintiff must show
more than that the employer regarded him as an alcoholic and a security risk so that he
could not do a range of security sensitive jobs. The plaintiff would have to show the
number and types of jobs the employer thought he would be unable to perform. Id. at *12.
268
176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, in Overstreet v. Calvert County Health Dept., 187 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D.
Md. 2002), the defendant argued that being an addiction counselor is not a broad enough
range of jobs to qualify the plaintiff as regarded as disabled. The court did not reach this
issue because it held that the plaintiff was not constructively discharged. It did bring up
the interesting question of whether she qualified to be an addiction counselor if she was
still drinking.
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269

Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (1998)(plaintiff could not work as Addiction
Technician because of her seizure disorder); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335
(plaintiff’s hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter). Zenor, 176 F.3d
at 860.
270
Justin S. Gilbert, Prior History, Present Discrimination, and the ADA’s “Record of”
Disability, 31 U. OF MEMPHIS L. REV. 659, 661 (2001).
271
Id. at 661-62.
272
306 F. 3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
273
Id. at 1169.
274
119 F.3d 305 (1997).
275
See supra discussion accompanying notes .
276
Id. at 317.
277
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
278
Id. at 281.
279
See supra text accompanying note 15.
280
Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004).
281
358 F.3d at 115.
282
See, e.g., Altman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 100 F.3d 1054
(2dCir. 1996) (the court held that the plaintiff was not qualified to serve as Chief of
Medicine because of his inability to stay sober and his conduct that endangered patients
and the hospital when he was drinking).
283
See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 248 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2001) (An employee who does come
to work on a regular basis is “not qualified” even if caused by his alcoholism, and the
employer is not required to accommodate his excessive absenteeim.); Leary v. Dalton, 58
F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995);
284
Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748.
285
Id. at 753.
286
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(2000). See supra note 29 for text of section.
287
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110, 115-116 (1st Cir. 2004).
288
See, e.g., Leary, 58 F.3d at 753.
289
See, e.g., Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723 (10th Cir.
2000), in which the court said that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, but firing for misconduct is not firing for disability.
290
951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991)
291
951 F.2d. at 516.
292
62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995).
293
See, e.g., Pernice v. Chicago, 237 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2001) (court cited the virtual
unanimity of the circuits on the issue that employers are allowed to fire employees for
misconduct, even if it is related to their disability.); Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.,
229 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000)(court held that defendant fired plaintiff not because it
perceived her as an alcoholic but because she was under the influence of alcohol on the
job, for which any employee would be fired); Adamczyk v. Chief of Police of Baltimore
County, 134 F.3d 362 (4th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff could be fired for egregious conduct, even
if related to alcoholism.); Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998),
(plaintiff company president was ousted for misconduct. The Board of Directors told him
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that they thought he had a drug problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs.
He was evaluated and was determined to be a drug addict. The Board discharged him for
trespassing into private homes); Burch v. Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997),
(the court cited a number of other cases in which firing for misconduct is not firing for
alcoholism. Id. at 319 n.14); Walker v. Consolidated Biscuit Co., 11 F.3d 1481 (6th Cir.
1997) (employee fired for being under the influence of alcohol at work, not because he
was an alcoholic.); Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 1996) (employee fired
for making threats against other employees while in treatment for alcoholism.); Leary v.
Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995), (the court said that alcoholism is a disability under
the Rehabilitation Act, but that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of
the job. One of the functions of the job was showing up to work as scheduled. Because
the plaintiff was in jail for driving while intoxicated, he could show up for work. He was
terminated for excessive unauthorized absence.).
294
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
295
42 U.S.C. §12114 (c) (2000).
296
162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998)
297
162 F.3d at 608-09.
298
See, e.g., Pernice v. Chicago, 237 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2001).
299
See, e.g., Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F. 3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000). In this
case, the plaintiff was a physician in the defendant’s hospital. Based on reports that
employees had smelled alcohol on the plaintiff’s breath, she had been evaluated as having
a possible alcohol problem. She submitted to drug testing for a year and was allowed to
resume social drinking. Shortly thereafter there were reports that she smelled of alcohol.
She agreed to resume drug testing, but the hospital declined and required her to go into
treatment. When she refused, they fired her. The plaintiff contended that she had been
fired because she was perceived as an alcoholic. The hospital contended that she was
fired for being under the influence of alcohol on the job which endangered her patients,
not because she was perceived as an alcoholic. However, the person who carried out the
actual termination admitted that he fired the plaintiff because he believed that she was an
alcoholic and refused treatment. She was also fired because she presented a safety risk
to her patients and a business risk to the hospital because patients would not want to see a
physician who smelled of alcohol. 229 F.3d at 666.
300
See, e.g., Fogle v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 32 Fed. Appx. 155 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff fired
for excessive absenteeism, not drug addiction); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants
and required to participate in a treatment program. Her employer fired her for her
absence during the treatment program. The court said that she could be held to the same
performance standards as other employees.).
301
See, e.g., Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (decision to
drive is not due to alcoholism but bad conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated.
The court said that the plaintiff’s alcoholism was not the sole cause of his drunk driving;
he had to make a decision to drive while drunk.)
302
See, e.g., Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff was
convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to participate in a
treatment program. Her employer fired her for her absence during the treatment program.
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The court said that she could be held to the same performance standards as other
employees.); Arbogast v. Alcoa Building Products, 165 F.3d 31 (7th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff,
unable to attend training classes because he had lost his drivers license after his third
DUI, asked for transportation as a reasonable accommodation, which was refused. The
court said he was not discriminated against because of his alcoholism, but rather his bad
behavior and that he could not show that other similarly situated employees were treated
differently.); Ibarra v. Sunset Scavenger Co., 2003 WL 21244096 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(Plaintiff truckdriver was suspended for crashing a company vehicle while driving drunk.
He was subsequently terminated because he was unable to regain his driver’s license after
the incident within the six months required under the collective bargaining agreement.
The court said that the ADA does not require accommodation and expressly authorizes
employers to hold alcoholic employees to the same standards as other employees.);
LaBrucherie v. The Regents of the University of California, 1995 U.S.Dist.Lexis 12763
(N.D. Cal. 1995)(unpublished)(fired for absence from work due to incarceration for
DUI).
303
See, e.g., Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 209 F.3d
931 (6th Cir. 2000) (The plaintiff was not hired as a school driver because of a prior
incident in which he had been caught drinking on the job. The court said that whether the
employer perceived him as an alcoholic or not, it could refuse to hire him because of his
prior bad conduct.) Livingstone v. U.S. Postal Service, 168 F.3d 490, 1998 WL 791828
(6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). (Even if plaintiff was dismissed because of his
intoxication, the fact that he arrived at work unable to perform his duties and threatened
the safety of others was sufficient to support his discharge. Even if his misconduct was
related to alcoholism, he could be legitimately discharged for the misbehavior. 1998 WL
791828 at **6; Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (discharge for firing
assault rifle in a bar).
In a twist on misconduct cases, in Brennan v. New York City Police Dept., 141
F.3d 1151 (Table) 1998 WL 51284 (2nd Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was a policeman, who at
the time of his alleged forced resignation, was a recovering alcoholic. However, before
he got into recovery, he had consumed alcohol and fallen asleep on a public transport.
When he awoke, he was disoriented and left his gun in a bag on the subway. It was never
recovered. He said that falling asleep was not the result of his consumption of alcohol,
but because he had worked a long shift. 1998 WL 51284 at *1. After another incident,
he went into a treatment program. After treatment, he was placed on restricted duty and
later resigned because he was not returned to active duty. The plaintiff complained that
he was forced to resign because of his alcoholism. 1998 WL 51284 at *2. The court said
that it was not disputed that the plaintiff was protected by the ADA because he was a
person who had a record of a disability as an alcoholic. However, the court said that he
was not otherwise qualified because of his carelessness in losing the gun. Because the
plaintiff himself said he had not lost the gun as a consequence of his alcoholism, the court
said that he was not forced to resign because of his alcoholism. The court further said
that a reasonable accommodation would be inappropriate because he himself did not
attribute his carelessness to his disability. 1998 WL 51284 at *3.
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The current consensus with regard to misconduct related to a disability is
expressed in Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995), in which the
plaintiff was discharged for driving under the influence, as follows:
To impose liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the
Rehabilitation Act in such circumstances would indirectly but
unmistakably undermine the laws that regulate dangerous behavior. It
would give alcoholics and other diseased or disabled persons a privilege to
avoid some of the normal sanctions for criminal activity. It would say to
an alcoholic: We know it is more difficult for you to avoid committing the
crime of drunk driving than it is for healthy people, and therefore we will
lighten the sanction by letting you keep your job in circumstances where
anyone else who engaged in the same criminal behavior would lose it.
The refusal to excuse, or even alleviate the punishment of, the disabled
person who commits a crime under the influence as it were of his
disability yet not compelled by it and so not excused by it in the eyes of
the criminal law is not "discrimination" against the disabled; it is a refusal
to discriminate in their favor . It is true that the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act require the employer to make a
reasonable accommodation of an employee's disability, but we do not
think it is a reasonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of
law.
We can imagine a slightly different case in which Despears would stand
on firmer ground. Suppose when he was hired by the medical facility he
told his employer, "I dare not drive because of my alcoholism, and
therefore I ask you to excuse me from having to have a driver's license to
be a maintenance worker, since driving is not an essential part of the job."
That would be a request for an accommodation, rather than a request to be
excused from a consequence of criminal activity.
Id. at 636. The court said that the decision to drive is not due to alcoholism but bad
conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated. The court said that the plaintiff’s
alcoholism was not the sole cause of his drunk driving; he had to make a decision to drive
while drunk.
304
Id. at 636.
305
See, e.g., Brohm v. JH Properties, 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998), in which the court
analogized the plaintiff anesthesiologist’s sleeping during surgical procedures caused by
sleep apnea to cases in which the plaintiff was fired for misconduct caused by his
alcoholism. The court noted that in Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1991), the court said that a termination for excessive absenteeism caused by
the plaintiff’s alcoholism was discrimination based solely on disability because it was
based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff’s disability. The court said it is like a
plaintiff whose limp causes him to make a thump when he walks, and the employer firing
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him for making the thumping noise. 951 F.2d. at 516. However, the court in the instant
case repudiated that analysis and said that firing someone for misconduct caused by their
disability is not firing them because of their disability. The court referred to its decision
in Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) in which the court had
approved the firing of a football coach for driving while intoxicated which the plaintiff
alleged was causally connected to his alcoholism. The Sixth Circuit had held there that
there is a distinction between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging
someone for his disability. Otherwise the employer would have to accommodate
behavior considered unacceptable in other employees because of the plaintiff’s disability.
In the instant case, the plaintiff had alleviated the effects the sleep apnea and was
nevertheless fired from the job. 149 F.3d at 522. See Kelly Cahill Timmons,
Accommodating Misconduct Under The Americans With Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV.
187 (2005) for a discussion of misconduct and disabilities other than alcoholism.
Similarly in Gasper v. Perry, 155 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 1998), the court said that an
employer may discharge an employee for misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to
the plaintiff’s disability. In this case, the plaintiff had difficulty relating to people
because of catastrophic injuries received in an accident.
In a particularly harsh and inexplicable case, Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997), the court said that the employer may prefer a nondisabled employee over a disabled employee who does not perform as well, even if his
less able performance is due to his disability. The plaintiff had been out of work because
of a heart attack, so he was rated low on quantity of work performed. The court said he
was not fired because of his disability; he was fired as a consequence of his disability.
128 F.3d at 1197.
306
See infra note 308.
307
216 F.3d 1088 (Table) 2000 WL 743684 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
308

Numerous courts in other circuits have similarly held that violation of
return to work agreements or Last Chance Agreements constitute
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating employees. See
Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1181-85 (6th Cir.1997)
(employer did not violate the ADA in discharging an alcoholic employee
who failed to comply with his Last Chance Agreement, which conditioned
his employment on counseling and periodic testing for substance abuse);
Hinnershitz v. Ortep of Pa., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7148, 1998 WL 962096, at
*6 (E.D.Pa. Dec.22, 1998), aff'd, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir.1999) (defendant
articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's
discharge where the plaintiff breached his return to work agreement);
Nanopoulos v. Lukens Steel Co., No. 96 Civ. 6483, 1997 WL 438463, at
*4 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir.1998) (where the
defendant has advanced valid, non-discriminatory reasons for firing the
plaintiff, namely, his violation of his Last Chance Agreement, no rational
jury could find discrimination); Golson v. Runyon, 812 F.Supp. 558, 561
(E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that the plaintiff was fired because she breached
her Last Chance Agreement, not because she was an alcoholic); Brock v.
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Lucky Stores, No. 98 Civ. 4758, 2000 WL 288395, at *6 (N.D.Cal.
Mar.14, 2000), aff'd, 23 Fed. Appx. 709, 2001 WL 1458014 (9th
Cir.2001) (the plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with a return to work
agreement was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the
plaintiff); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 743, 767-68
(S.D.Tex.2001) (no discrimination where the plaintiff had received an
opportunity to obtain treatment and subsequently violated a return to work
agreement); McKey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F.Supp. 1313, 1319
(S.D.Tex.1997) (the defendants' termination of the plaintiff for failing to
honor the terms and conditions of his return to work agreement was a
legitimate reason for termination of his employment).
Mayo v. Columbia University, 2003 WL 1824628 **6 n7 (S.D. N.Y. 2003)
(unpublished).
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